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I Introduction
In the decades preceding the turn of the millennium, thousands of oil spills in the area
of the Niger Delta with an accumulated spillage of around three million barrels of oil
had a major impact on the local ecosystem. The environmental disaster was caused by
oil drilling conducted by multinational oil companies such as Shell, ExxonMobile and
Chevron and destroyed the rainforest and the mangrove ecosystem as well as depleted
fish populations (Human Rights Watch, 1999). Additional major oil spillages from Shell
pipelines in the same region in 2008 and 2009 destroyed the living habitat of farmers
and ruined the livelihoods of fishers (The Guardian, 2011). In 2015, waste water from
iron ore mining by BHP Biliton flooded Bento Rodrigues in Brazil, contaminated the
river Rio Doce and later reached the Atlantic Ocean after a dam breaking. The toxic
mud polluting the river and sea presented an existential threat, not only to fishermen
and tourism but also to the rich marine life (The Guardian, 2015). In 2006, more
than 500 tonnes of toxic oil waste dumped by the London-based oil company Trafigura
caused a health crisis in Abidjan, the capital of Ivory Coast (The Guardian, 2009).
The list of examples of severe environmental damage in developing countries caused by
international resource extracting companies can be extended much further. Much more
environmental harm in the global South can be traced back to a high standard of living
and economic activity by members of the industrialized world.1 One example is the
pollution caused from illegal e-waste shipped from Europe to Western African countries.
Especially Agbogbloshie, located close to Ghana’s capital, Accra, and Nigeria’s largest
city, Lagos, are hubs for dysfunctional electronic goods from industrialized countries.
In these cities, recycling to extract the metals is done in a technology-distant manner
by burning these goods and thereby massively emitting air pollutants. The five large
garbage patches floating the ocean compose another example and are similarly alarming.
The garbage, mainly composed of plastics, is a result of the high standard of living
in the North, while the environmental consequences have to be born globally. The
microparticles of plastic threaten the life of various fish and bird species and through
them enter the food chain (Gross, 2013). In 2013, the Blacksmith Institute updated its
original list from 2006 of the world’s worst polluted places. All ten of the places listed
1Throughout the dissertation the ‘South’ refers to developing countries whilst the ‘North’ to developed
countries.
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are located in low and middle income countries;2 Agbogbloshie and the Niger River
Delta are two of them (Blacksmith Institute, 2013).
Recent studies have identified various types of economic activities by industrialized
countries as reasons for environmental harm and pollution. Butt et al. (2013) show that
global biodiversity is under threat from future fossil fuel extraction. In particular, they
identify regions where large quantities of marine and terrestrial species are threatened
when the sizable petroleum reserves and coal deposits are to be exploited. While the
regions identified as especially prone to this threat are all situated in the global South,
fossil fuel extraction is often conducted by multinational companies. The seven super-
majors (including their acquisitions), responsible for 15 (22)% of global oil drilling, all
have headquarters in industrialized countries.3 Fifty-eight percent of global drilling is
conducted by companies based in high income countries.4 Arezki et al. (2016) point out
that the historical focus of resource extraction in the industrialized countries has experi-
enced a shift towards the global South and further acknowledge an increased likelihood
of future major discoveries in developing countries. Adding to resource extraction as
major environmental threat, Moran and Kanemoto (2017) identify the global hotspots
of species threatened from international trade. They document an extensive list of
biodiversity threat hotspots which are driven by US and European consumption. The
cluster of these hotspots in the South, specifically in Central America, Brazil, Central
and Southeast Asia, and many parts of Africa, is striking.
The quality of institutions is a determining factor for the economic engagement of
Northern actors in Southern countries (Arezki et al., 2016) and, as I show in this disser-
tation, is also key for the environmental consequences of this engagement. The recent
protests against the XL-pipeline in Dakota in 2016 and the start of 2017 portray the
fear of inhabitants of the devastating environmental consequences and the importance
of freedom of speech to mitigate potential pollution. Particularly developing countries
face the difficult trade-off between exploiting natural resource rents and protecting the
environment. Democratic institutions such as freedom of speech and political participa-
tion, especially for minorities like indigenous people whose habitat is primarily affected
2Countries are classified to the World Bank’s definition.
3The seven supermajor oil drilling companies are: BP, Shell, ExxonMobil, Chevron, ENI, Total,
and ConocoPhillips. Their headquarters are located in the United States, the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, Italy, and France.
4Own calculations based on MacKenzie’s pathfinder database on global exploration drilling. The
database is explained in more detail in chapter 3.
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by environmental destruction, are key in aligning companies’ and governments’ interest
in rent maximization with concerns of sustainability and environment conservation.
The risk of environmental harm in the context of North-South economic relation-
ships has been treated in a large body of literature, spanning from the pollution haven
hypothesis (PHH)5 to the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC)6 and the North-South
trade literature (see e.g. Chichilnisky, 1994, 1997; Copeland and Taylor, 1994). This
thesis tackles two issues in this context: the first two papers consider the environmental
consequences of resource extraction, usually conducted in a North-South setting which
is introduced with a theoretical model in the first paper and empirically analyzed in the
second paper. The institutional quality of the resource-rich South is identified as crucial
factor determining the extent of environmental harm caused by North-South engagement
in the context of resource extraction. The third paper looks at trade with second-hand
electronic goods and subsequent energy consumption in developing countries. Similar to
the findings of the PHH which argues that pollution is relocated to the South through
a shift in dirty production, the third paper claims that energy consumption is relocated
likewise by exporting comparatively energy-intensive electronic consumption goods and
substituting the used products for new, more energy efficient ones.
Before chapters 2, 3, and 4 present my essays on the environmental aspects of North-
South economic relationships, I use the remainder of the introduction to touch on the
corresponding literature in which I place the findings. I start by shortly portraying
the relationship identified between pollution, economic development, and institutional
quality. Embedded in the literature of the resource curse, I outline the importance of
institutions in resource extraction and display the various dimensions of institutional
quality and their relevance for environmental protection. Then, I focus on the matter
of environmental harm caused by resource extraction. I conclude the introduction by
giving a short summary of each of the following essays and pointing out my contribution
to the state of the art.
5The PHH postulates that emission reductions in industrialized countries are mainly achieved by
shifting production in dirty industries to the global South which has a comparative advantage due to
laxer environmental regulations (Kearsley and Riddel, 2010). For surveys on rather recent studies on
the PHH see Copeland and Taylor (2004) and Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004). Levinson and Taylor
(2008) deal with measurement errors, among others, due to endogeneity and find evidence for the PHH.
6According to the environmental Kuznets curve, the relationship between pollution and income per
capita is inversely U-shaped. The name corresponds to Simon Kuznets who detected the same shape in
the relationship of income inequality and per capita income (Stern, 2003).
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The relationship between the environment and economic prosperity in a country has
often been described with the help of the environmental Kuznets curve. Commonly, the
shape of the environmental Kuznets curve is explained by the structural change from
agricultural production, on to industrialization towards the tertiary sector which relies
to a lesser degree on pollutants (see e.g. Ja¨nicke et al., 1997). Economic growth is
usually accompanied by trade openness which is simultaneously often held responsible
for environmental consequences of economic development. While the evidence on the
relationship between trade and environmental degradation is diverse, trade openness
is often acknowledged to play a positive role for the conservation of the environment
since countries reduce pollution emissions when facing more competition and are more
efficient in resource use (summarized e.g. in Cole, 2004). The impact of trade on the
environment can be broken down into three independent effects: the scale effect, which
predicts an increase in pollution due to economic growth, the technique effect, which
refers to the application of cleaner technologies alongside stricter environmental regula-
tions in richer economies, and the composition effect, which assumes the production of
cleaner products according to the comparative advantage of more developed countries
(Grossman and Krueger, 1991). This final assumption is in line with the PHH granting
North-South trade an important role in the reduction of pollution in more developed
countries (Cole, 2004). According to the PHH, lower levels of environmental regulation
in developing countries induce the relocation of pollution-intensive production from the
stricter-regulated developed countries. A global protection of the environment is, how-
ever, not achieved. Similarly, Chichilnisky (1994) identifies the lack of property rights
in the South on the environment as common good to induce trade and therewith the
outsourcing of dirty industries to developing countries even if North and South were
otherwise identical. In natural sciences, the North’s demand for commodities produced
in the South and the resulting trade is made responsible for at least 30% of global species
threats (Lenzen et al., 2012; Essl et al., 2012). Furthermore, the global existence of the
environmental Kuznets curve as well as the benefits of trade for the environment are in
doubt (see e.g. Liddle, 2001; Stern, 2003). On the one hand, evidence for different pollu-
tants and numbers of species threatened is mixed (Shafik, 1994; Lenzen et al., 2012). On
the other hand, the possibilities for developing countries to outsource on their ends the
polluting industries to move along the curve with economic progress are finite with the
number of countries remaining at the lower end of the scale of environmental regulation.
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In contrast to the conventional view which hypothesizes economic development to be
the key factor determining the level of environmental conservation, Buitenzorgy and Mol
(2010) show that the level of pollutions is driven by the level of democracy in a country
instead of per capita income. This finding is in line with the in-length discussion of
Acemoglu (2001; 2005) having democratic institutions at the heart of economic develop-
ment in a country. In numerous studies, the positive correlation of different dimensions
of democracy and per capita income has been shown (see e.g. Hall and Jones, 1999;
Easterly and Levine, 2002; North, 1990). Figure I.1 displays the positive correlation be-
tween a chosen set of different dimensions of institutional quality.7 Alongside common
indicators of democratic values and institutional quality, such as rule of law, control of
corruption (both measured, among others, in the WGI), democracy versus autocracy
(PolityIV) and freedom of speech (Freedom House index), environmental regulations
enforced by the government portray an important dimension of institutional quality.
The World Economic Forum provides one of the few global indices of environmental
stringency and enforcement of environmental regulations. Similarly, the number of in-
ternational treaties concerning the environment signed by a country is often considered
as a proxy for the environmental awareness of this country. As a third measure, the
environmental performance index (EPI) ranks countries according to their policy accom-
plishments in the areas of environmental health and ecosystem vitality.8 The positive
correlations of these indices portray the multi-facetted nature of institutions. In addition
to common characteristics of institutional quality the positive linkage to environmental
awareness is shown in the figure. The various dimensions contribute in diverse ways to
the key role institutions play in determining international economic engagement as well
as environmental conservation in economic activities.
The quality of democratic institutions has also been identified to tip the scale if
resource-richness leads to economic high performance or not. The puzzling coexistence
of resource-richness and lack of development has been detected (Sachs and Warner,
7Additionally to the correlations pictured in figure I.1, correlation coefficients of all WGI measure-
ments and positive institution indicators from the PolityIV database with the measurements for envi-
ronmental awareness in a country are positive and significant at the 1% level.
8Data are retrieved from: The World Bank (2016); The Polity IV Project, Center for Systemic Peace
(2016); World Economic Forum (2016); United Nations Environment Programme (2016). The values of
rule of law (RL), control of corruption (CC), and democracy are taken as averages over the first decade in
the new century. Environmental stringency and the environmental performance index are not measured
yearly in the same period, hence 2011 and 2014 are taken as closest reference points respectively. The
number of treaties signed are listed by UNEP, considering twelve major environmental treaties in the
year 2000.
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Figure I.1: Correlation between different dimensions of institutional quality
Notes: Rule of law (RL) and control of corruption (CC) are two components of the world governance
indicators (WGI), democracy is part of the PolityIV database. A country’s stringency in environmental
protection is measured on a scale from 1 to 7 by the World Economic Forum (WEF). Data on the
environmental performance index (EPI) and the number of treaties signed are available on in the UNEP
database.
1995) and experienced afterwards an extensive discussion on the so-called resource-
curse. When opposing the very different stories of failing oil-rich African countries, such
as Nigeria and D.R. Congo, with the prosperous oil-rent initiated economy of Norway,
the difference of resource-dependency and resource-abundance has been taken as one
explanation (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008). While the increased likelihood of the
occurrence of a Dutch disease9 delivers a macroeconomic explanation for the resource
9The Dutch disease refers to the appreciation of the local currency resulting from large increases of
income or inflows of foreign currencies often observed as response to the discovery of natural resources.
The term describes the phenomenon that this appreciation leads to less competitive exports in sectors
different from the discovered natural resource. The harmful consequences for the economy, including
high unemployment rates, were first observed in the Netherlands after the discovery of large natural gas
deposits (Corden and Neary, 1982).
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curse in a non-diversified economy, good institutional quality is key to make resource-
abundance to a success-story for the economy (Mehlum et al., 2006). Van der Ploeg
(2011) lists various reasons, in addition to the Dutch disease, that can explain the
resource curse. Most of them are linked to poor institutional quality, such as unsustain-
able policies, poor rule of law, ethnic fractionalization, armed conflicts, bad financial
systems, and crowding out of FDI. On the one hand, good institutions are needed to
set incentives when managing the excessive rents from resource extraction. Excessive
government rents exempt the society from taxes but also release accountability from
political elites to invest state revenues responsibly, sustainably, and in society’s inter-
est. The lack of accountability to voters and tax payers, the consequential appearance
of “white elephants”, and the high correlation of oil rents and corruption display the
importance of functional institutions to prevent the failing of oil-rich countries. On the
other hand, an unstable political environment, social conflicts, and the risk of expro-
priation due to missing property rights protection lead to insecurity for international
investors and explain why historically fewer investments for resource extraction have
been aimed towards the global South (Arezki et al., 2016). This is in line with the
finding that countries with better institutions are also more likely to discover oil since
companies prefer the investment in stable environments (Cust and Harding, 2014). The
authors provide evidence with a regression discontinuity design that in the case of oil
fields being located in a border region, companies chose to invest for resource extraction
in countries with better institutional conditions.
In addition to managing resource reserves as well as the rents, institutional quality is
also key to conciliate between the different interests of companies and governments re-
garding profit maximization and society’s concern for the protection of the environment
and indigenous habitat. As the trade-off between resource rents and environmental pro-
tection is especially difficult for developing countries, the quality of political institutions
in the South plays a major role for the protection of the environment.
When talking about the resource curse, subsoil fuels such as oil and gas but also min-
erals are considered, i.e. non-renewable natural resources that generate a sizable rent
when being extracted. Recent literature focuses on the potentially detrimental process
of shale gas extraction when considering the environmental consequences of resource ex-
traction (Fontenot et al., 2013; Olmstead et al., 2013; Warner et al., 2013; Gibbons et al.,
12
2016) while traditional resource extraction can also be considered as serious interference
with nature - even in the absence of disastrous accidents as portrayed in the beginning of
this text. Pollution of air and water as well as soil contamination, clearance of forested
areas, and resulting loss of biodiversity and soil erosion are common consequences of
resource extraction (Aigbedion and Iyayi, 2007). Butt et al. (2013) point out the threat
of future fossil fuel extraction for biodiversity. For all onshore mining and drilling, clear-
ance of the countryside and consequential landscape degradation is necessary. Chemical
spillages, such as mercury and cyanide, e.g. occur in the extraction of gold (De Lacerda,
2003; Tarras-Wahlberg et al., 2001). The dimension of mercury spillage from gold min-
ing has been analyzed in various case studies and estimated to sum up globally to 640 to
1350 Mg of mercury per annum by 70 countries involved in artisanal and small scale gold
mining (ASGM) (Telmer and Veiga, 2009). As the largest sector of demand for mer-
cury, ASGM therewith accounts for 37% of global mercury emissions (United Nations
Environment Programme, 2013). In the area of the Ecuadorian Amazon, particularly
in the rivers located close to oil wells, increased levels of hydrocarbons and toxic heavy
metals have been detected (Sebastian et al., 2001). Furthermore, large volumes of green-
house gases are emitted in flaring sites where superfluous natural gas, a by-product from
oil extraction which cannot be used commercially, is burnt (Ozabor and Obisesan, 2015).
The first two essays deal with this kind of environmental consequences from resource
extraction conducted in a North-South setting. It is shown that the extent of environ-
mental harm depends on the quality of institutions in the South. In the following, I
summarize the findings of the first two essays, put them in context of the dissertation
and, in the case of the joint work of the second essay, state my contribution to the
findings. The third essay deals with the increase in global energy consumption due to
North-South trade with second-hand electronic goods. I give a short introduction to
the related rebound effect and the relevance of energy consumption in the light of the
protection of the environment and climate change. I conclude the introduction by sum-
marizing the findings of this third essay.
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Environmental Aspects of Resource Extraction Contracts
In the first essay, I develop a theoretical model to analyze the impact of resource
extraction conducted by a company from an industrialized country in a resource-rich
developing country on the local environment. Analogously to Engel and Fischer (2008),
the modeled resource partnership builds on a resource extraction contract between these
two parties. Oshionebo (2010) explains the circumstances under which resource extrac-
tion contracts are set up. A resource-rich developing country lacks the technological
expertise and capital to conduct resource extraction on its own. The investing company,
often a transnational corporation, needs security to undertake the necessary investment
for exploiting the natural resources. The unstable environment bares, among others,
the risk of expropriation. In this set-up, democratic institutions in the host country are
assumed to matter for two crucial aspects: For one thing, institutional quality signifies
the quality of property rights protection and the consequential risk of expropriation for
the investing operating company. For another, institutional quality also correlates with
environmental awareness of the host country and consequently determines the conditions
regarding environmental protection in a resource extraction contract.
Depending on the applied quality of the extraction technology, resource extraction is
assumed to differ with respect to its volume and in the degree of environmental degrada-
tion caused in the process. The model shows that improvements in institutional quality
work in contradicting directions. On the one hand, by mitigating the holdup problem
and encouraging therewith a higher level of investment into resource extraction. On the
other hand, with improvements in the institutional quality the environmental awareness
in a country increases, demanding a cleaner resource extraction technology from the
investor. While the theoretical model cannot determine a unique impact of an improve-
ment in democracy on the environment, the numerical simulation of three distinct cases
suggests that, despite these contradicting forces, environmental quality always benefits
from improvements in democracy. The environmental benefits from an improvement in
the applied quality of the extraction technology, however, depend on the relationship of
gained marginal efficiency in productivity versus cleanliness.
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Forest Loss from Oil Activities: A Matter of Democracy
In the second essay, joint work with James Cust and Torfinn Harding, an empirical
analysis is conducted to estimate the amount of forest loss in the course of oil and gas
drilling. In a global dataset we find vast differences across countries in the amount of
forest clearance due to oil drilling in the closest vicinity to oil wells. Adding to prior
studies that found a temporal and spatial correlation of oil drilling and forest loss for
Northern America (Allred et al., 2015), we conduct a quasi-natural experiment to prove
a causal relationship. In a panel dataset of 3331 exploration wells drilled in the period
between 2004 and 2010, we take advantage of the companies reporting if exploration
was successful and distinguish in a difference-in-difference approach between oil wells
and dry holes. Controlling for well and year fixed-effects, we find that in countries
with low democracy scores deforestation associated with an oil discovery accumulates
to almost 73% of the immediate vicinity within ten years - twice as high as in countries
with high democracy scores. Interestingly, the level of forest clearance does neither
differ systematically with the type of the operating company nor with the democracy
score of the operating company’s home country. Furthermore, income per capita in the
oil country does not seem to be the driving force behind the cross-country variance.
The supplementary material describes the applied methodology and presents various
robustness checks on possible explanations for the variance of the degree in deforestation.
We conclude that in the end, the host country’s quality of institutions determines the
impact of oil drilling on the environment.
To the best of our knowledge, it is the first work that provides global evidence that
oil and gas extraction is associated with forest loss and further, adding to this, identi-
fies the quality of the host country’s institution as crucial determinant for the size of
deforestation. The investigation on the forest as indicator for the environmental quality
is chosen due to the ability to measure tree cover and its dynamic change on a global
level. With the help of remote sensing data this indicator is robust to heterogeneity in
measurement techniques and standards across countries. My contribution to the joint
work started by constructing a dataset which consists of 62 countries. With the help of
geo-informational software and global satellite images of forest cover provided by Hansen
et al. (2013), I calculated average tree cover and forest loss as well as yearly forest loss
for a thirteen-year period in the direct vicinity of 3331 oil wells where exploration took
place between 2004 and 2010. In consultation with my co-authors, I further provided
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the graphical as well as statistical evidence for spatial and temporal correlation of oil
drilling and clearance of forest. Finally, I conducted a difference-in-difference approach
to identify the causal relationship. I enhanced the dataset by including identities of
the operating company, derived from the Wood Mackenzie pathfinder’s database (Wood
Mackenzie, 2011) as well as a self-created dataset on listings of the companies, and vari-
ous indicators for institutional quality of the host country as well as the operator’s source
country. I expanded the difference-in-difference approach with these characteristics to
find vast differences in the causal relationship across countries but without finding prove
for systematic heterogeneity across types of operating companies.
The first two essays jointly enhance the existing literature on the impact of resource
extraction on the environment. The first essay postulates the hypothesis of institutional
quality in the host country playing a crucial role for the environmental burden caused by
resource extraction. Applying a quasi-natural experiment on exploration and discovery
of oil on a global scale, the second paper provides empirical evidence for this hypothesis
and identifies democracy as explaining factor for the variant amount of forest clearance
caused from oil drilling. However, the assumption of varying environmental harm from
distinct operating technologies cannot be supported. The distinction between different
types of operators is chosen as proxy for the heterogeneity in the applied quality of
extraction technology. Identifying the heterogeneity of operators by comparing char-
acteristics such as multinational privately operated oil companies versus national oil
companies, listed versus non-listed, operators from different source countries, or vari-
ation in companies’ size does not yield a statistically significant effect on the level of
deforestation.
International Trade in Second-hand Electronic Goods and the Resulting Global Rebound
Effect
The third essay approaches the issue of global environmental harm in the context of
North-South economic relations in the form of CO2 emissions from energy consump-
tion. The paper provides a look on the extended use of end-of-life electronic goods in
developing countries and the corresponding worldwide energy consumption. The work
is imbedded in a larger project on the rebound effect funded by the Ministry of Innova-
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tion, Science and Research (MIWF) of North-Rhine Westphalia, Germany with project
management by Energie, Technologie und Nachhaltigkeit (ETN) (Grant No. 313-005-
2013-W029-MIWF). The rebound effect is an empirical phenomenon which describes
that innovations in energy saving technologies reduce energy consumption by less than
the expected amount due to an adaptation of consumer behavior (Sorrell et al., 2009).
This effect has been widely analyzed and found to be of a larger size in developing
countries with a greater distance to saturation (Sorrell, 2007; Roy, 2000; Ouyang et al.,
2010; Li and Yonglei, 2012). In this essay, I, in turn, raise attention to the fact that
savings in energy consumption resulting from innovations concerning more energy ef-
ficient consumption goods can also be overestimated due to neglecting the continued
use of the substituted electronics. I provide descriptive statistics which make the case
of industrialized countries exporting lower valued second-hand electronic goods to de-
veloping countries. Supported by anecdotal evidence, this suggests that second-hand
electronic goods are exported to the global South. Applying two-stage-least squares
regressions with a gravity equation instrumenting for trade volumes in the first stage,
a subsequent increase in the consumer group is found to be statistically significant for
African countries leading to an overall increase in worldwide energy consumption.
The global public bad aspect of CO2 emissions associated with the increase of global
energy consumption and the resulting climate change make this global rebound effect
a matter of environmental concern. Energy consumption in households accounts for
about one third of national energy demand (Cook et al., 2011; Kavousian et al., 2013)
and therewith contributes substantially to CO2 emissions. Furthermore, Wolfram et al.
(2012) explain that the expected future increase in worldwide energy demand will be
mainly driven by developing countries, among others by their primary purchases of
electronic consumption goods. To my knowledge, the study is doing pioneer work in the
field of second-hand trade with electronic goods and corresponding energy consumption.
In analogy to the few studies that have tackled the issue of international trade with
second-hand goods and due to the missing distinction of new versus used goods in
international trading records, this study relies on anecdotal evidence and constructed
data to analyze the trade flows of concern.10 The environmental concerns related to trade
with second-hand electronic goods reach further than the issue of energy consumption.
10This technique has been applied in similar studies concerning trade with second-hand goods - see
e.g. Duan et al. (2014) and Sander and Schilling (2010).
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II Part II
Environmental Aspects of Resource Extraction Con-
tracts
Hanna Krings
Abstract
This paper analyzes resource partnerships and their influence on the environmen-
tal quality in a resource-rich country by introducing incomplete contracts, imperfect
property rights protection, and a lack of valuation for the environment by the govern-
ment in the South. Employing numerical simulations, I determine the equilibrium
extraction rate, the applied extraction technology, and the environmental quality
in dependence of the state of democracy in the resource-rich country. In contrast
to what one might expect, under certain circumstances it can be environmentally
beneficial to have incomplete contracts that induce the utilization of a suboptimal
technology for resource extraction. Further, reducing the holdup problem by shift-
ing bargaining power to the North, is only desirable if the environmental quality
increases with a better extraction technology.
JEL classification: F18, Q37, Q56
Keywords: Resource extraction, environment, North-South trade
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1 Introduction
Natural resources, such as rare earth elements or platinum, are an essential input in the
production of high technology goods. Firms in industrialized countries (from now on:
the North) producing these high-tech products depend on imports of natural resources
due to highly limited domestic reserves. The North relies heavily on the supply from
resource-rich countries, which can often be classified as developing or emerging coun-
tries (the South). The South, for its part, lacks appropriate technology needed for the
extraction of natural resources which could be provided by the North. A resource part-
nership presents one solution to this bilateral problem. Within a resource partnership,
a multinational corporation and the government from a resource-rich country negotiate
a resource extraction contract. In this contract the partners agree on extracting natural
resources from the South’s territory by applying an extraction technology which is pro-
vided by the North. The extracted resources can be used by the North as an input in
the production of high-technology goods. Hence, a resource extraction contract11 seems
to be a win-win situation for both partners. One example of such a partnership is the
engagement of the AngloAmerican corporation in Chile with regard to the extraction
of copper. The multinational contributes the extraction technology to this co-operation
and also exhibits the mining and final processing of the natural resource (AngloAmer-
ican, 2013). Through taxation the Chilean government receives a share of the revenue
generated by AngloAmerican.
The process of resource extraction is, however, polluting and detrimental to the en-
vironment in the resource-rich country. The extent of pollution caused by extracting
resources depends on the quality of the technological equipment used for the extraction
process (from now on: extraction technology or simply technology) and the amount of
resources extracted. The provision of the optimal extraction technology cannot be guar-
anteed due to the incomplete nature of resource extraction contracts, and consequently
the non-cooperative determination of the extraction technology by the North. A tech-
nology producing less waste or relying on less chemicals during the extraction process is
referred to as being “cleaner”. The cleaner the quality of the extraction technology, the
lesser the harm caused by the extraction process on the local environment. However,
in correspondence with the Porter hypothesis (Porter, 1991; Porter and van der Linde,
11The terms “resource extraction contract” and “resource partnership” are used interchangeably in
this analysis.
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1995) I assume that applying a better extraction technology does not only mean reduc-
ing the pollution caused by resource extraction but also enhancing cost efficiency in the
extraction process.
I apply a game-theoretic approach to show how forming a resource partnership af-
fects the environment in the resource-rich country. Within this setting, the quality
of the extraction technology applied as well as the amount of resources extracted are
determined. I identify the conditions under which an improvement in the extraction
technology is beneficial or harmful for the environment. I point out two market im-
perfections that influence the North’s decision on the extraction technology it wants to
provide. In particular, for one, the resource partnership is based on a contract which
cannot be fully enforced ex post due to its incomplete nature.12 Since the investment
undertaken by the North is contract-specific, a holdup problem as defined by Williamson
(1985) and Grossmann and Hart (1986) arises. Consequently, a lack of incentives re-
sults for the North regarding the investment in the optimal extraction technology. As a
second issue, the model developed in this paper accounts for the lack of environmental
consciousness in developing countries. This limited degree of environmental awareness
by the ruling government results in a negligence towards the environmental quality when
negotiating on the resource extraction contract. The activities of Royal Dutch Shell in
Nigeria, for example, demonstrate the consequences of a lack in environmental aware-
ness of a resource-rich country in combination with resource extraction conducted by
a multinational company. The oil recovery in the Niger Delta has caused substantial
ecological damage to the vulnerable ecosystem, for example through oil spills, drilling
sludge, and road construction (The Guardian, 2013). While the damage is neglected
by the government, the consequences for the rural population and the environment are
dramatic. In the following, I refer to these two factors as “externalities”. I investigate
upon the impact of both externalities on the provision of the extraction technology, the
consequences for the resource extraction rate, and the resulting level of environmental
quality in the resource-rich country.
The degree of democratization in the South influences to some extent both exter-
nalities. I therefore define democracy, or the degree of democratization, to mirror the
quality of property rights protection as well as the degree of environmental awareness of
12Examples, such as the Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa raising the share of oil windfall taxes
from 50% to 99% in 2007, portray the risk of expropriation for foreign investors in the extractive sector
in developing countries (The Economist, 2013).
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the government. This assumption about the two dimensions of democracy is supported
by two areas of research. In the first approach, a positive correlation of democracy and
property rights protection has been theoretically suggested and empirically confirmed
(Knutsen, 2011).13 Li (2009) shows that the risk of expropriation is lower in democra-
cies than in autocracies. Correspondingly, I assume that a more advanced democratic
state of the South implies a higher quality in property rights protection and therewith a
reduction in the risk of expropriation. According to the second approach, the degree of
environmental consciousness in a country depends to a large degree on the state of its
democratic institutions. Based on empirical findings of, among others, Arvin and Lew
(2011), I assume that regimes of less developed countries have a lower valuation of the
environment. Hence, a less democratic government puts less emphasis on the preser-
vation of the local environment when negotiating upon the terms and conditions of a
resource extraction contract.14 In the following, the equilibrium quality of the extraction
technology, the amount of resources extracted, and the resulting environmental quality
are therefore determined in dependence on the condition of the democratic institutions
in the South which is considered to be exogenous in this model. Throughout this paper,
I refer to (the state or level of) democracy or (the condition of) democratic institutions
to characterize the state of the government in the resource-rich country with regard to
both externalities. The process of democratization describes an improvement in this
state.
The research question about the environmental impact of a resource partnership is
answered in two sequences. First, how does a chosen extraction technology affect the en-
vironment? And second, which technological quality is applied in a resource partnership
and what are the consequences for the environment in dependence on the democratic
condition of the host country? The main results can be stated in three steps. For one,
an improvement in the quality of the extraction technology does not necessarily lead to a
better quality of the environment. In analogy to Smulders and Di Maria (2012), I classify
an extraction technology whose improvement leads to a higher degree of environmental
destruction as “brown”. If the improvement is environmentally beneficial, I consider the
technology as “green”. For the second finding, two channels through which democracy
13Additional work on the positive correlation between democracy and property rights can, e.g., be
found in North and Weingast (1989), Adsera et al. (2000), Leblang (1996), and Clague et al. (1996).
14Similar findings are presented, a.o., in Bhattarai and Hammig (2004) and Fredriksson and Wollscheid
(2007).
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in the South has an impact on the North’s decision on the quality of the extraction
technology are defined. It is shown that no clear-cut relationship between the degree
of democratization and the quality of the applied extraction technology can be found.
Correspondingly, the analytical analysis shows that the impact of democratization on
the South’s environmental state is also ambiguous. However, three cases analyzed in
numerical simulations portray a clearly positive relationship between democracy and
environmental quality.
This paper relates to three different strands of literature. For one, the literature on
resource extraction contracts analyzes the formation of international co-operations for
the joint exploitation of natural resources. The focus here lies on the North’s investment
decision in light of the risk of expropriation due to an insecure investment environment
in resource-rich countries (see e.g. Di Corato 2013, Engel and Fischer 2008, and Hajzler
2014). Hajzler (2012) identifies the extractive sector as being especially prone to ex-
propriation. Deacon and Bohn (2000) reflect upon the relevance of political instability
causing insecure investment in the extractive sector. In a second strand, the impact
of democracy on foreign direct investment (FDI) is debated in the literature. On the
one hand, a.o., Jensen (2003), Li (2009) and North and Weingast (1989) argue that
due to strengthened property rights protection, countries with democratic institutions
attract FDI. I adopt this approach due to my focus on the property rights aspect of
democracy. On the other hand, Li and Resnick (2003) show that when correcting for
the positive impact of property rights protection, democratic institutions hinder the
investment of multinational corporations. It is argued that multinational enterprises
can better exploit the profits from their investment if an autocratic regime rules the
host country. Asiedu and Lien (2011) find that for countries with an exceptionally high
share of exports from the extractive industries democracy may reduce investments. To
my knowledge, the aspect of environmental destruction has neither been considered in
the research on resource extraction contracts nor in the research on the relationship
between democracy and FDI in the extractive sector. In the field of environmental eco-
nomics, as the third relevant strand, Smulders and Di Maria (2012) classify abatement
technologies into green versus brown technologies. I apply this concept to the setting of
resource partnerships and determine the quality of the extraction technology applied in
dependence to the state of democracy in the resource-rich country.
In the following, I start off by introducing the model that describes a resource part-
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nership and presents the equilibrium level of technological quality provided by the North.
The impacts of an improvement in the technology as well as of the process of democ-
ratization on the environmental quality are described in section 3. I distinguish three
channels through which democratization in the South influences the environmental qual-
ity. The numerical simulations presented in the subsequent section 4 substantiate the
analytical findings. Finally, the last section sums up the results.
2 The Model
The environmental quality E in a resource-rich country is a function of the quantity
of resources extracted R and the quality of the technology T applied in the extraction
process, i.e. E = f(R, T ). I consider a resource partnership within which both of these
variables are determined. This partnership is modeled as a two-stage game with two
actors i ∈ {N,S}: A firm in an industrialized country, the North (N), which provides
the extraction technology and produces high-technology goods on the basis of natural
resources, and a developing country, the South (S), which is rich in natural resources. In
the first stage of the game, the North decides upon its provision of a resource extraction
technology of quality T . For the construction of this technology, sunk investment costs
of s(T ) = 12χT
2 occur, which are solely born by the North. It is assumed that the
marginal investment costs are increasing with the quality of the extraction technology.
In the second stage, the North and the South form a cooperation and decide jointly on
the extraction of the resource R. The Nash-bargaining solution determines the amount
of resources to extract, such that both parties’ surplus from entering the partnership
is maximized. The respective utility levels in case of a failure of the partnership give
the outside options and therewith the bargaining power of both partners. During the
extraction process two types of costs emerge whose extent depends on the provided
extraction technology: the extraction costs a(T ) and the environmental damage d(T )
per extracted resource unit. It is assumed that the extraction costs a(T ) are born by the
North while the South is affected by the environmental damage d(T ).15 The marginal
costs resulting from resource extraction, a(T ) = A − αT , depend negatively on the
quality of the extraction technology applied in the extraction process. Analogously, the
marginal environmental damage also decreases with an improvement in the extraction
15This is a convenient assumption. An alteration of the cost allocation does not, however, change the
outcomes for the equilibrium level of resource extraction and the quality of the extraction technology.
Hence, the equilibrium environmental quality is also not affected by this assumption.
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technology, giving d(T ) = D − δT . Hence, the quality of the extraction technology
has two dimensions: efficiency and cleanliness. In correspondence to Porter’s hypothesis
claiming “that a reduction in pollution may lead to an improvement in [...] productivity”
(Ambec et al., 2011), I thereby assume a positive relationship between cost efficiency
and environment-friendliness resulting from an increase in the quality of the extraction
technology.16 The extracted resource is then shipped to the North, which produces and
sells a final good Q based on this resource. For the sake of simplicity, a linear production
function for the final good with Q = R is assumed. Part of the revenue earned by the
North from selling the final good, i.e. a side payment Z, is used to reimburse the South
for the costs from environmental pollution and to share revenues. It is assumed that
the North has market power on the final goods market, facing a linear demand function
p(Q) = v− bQ. Subtracting the extraction costs a(T ) as well as the side payment Z for
the South from the return yields the North’s payoff function
GN = p(R)R− a(T )R− Z (1)
in dependence on the amount of resource extraction. The North targets to maximize
this payoff function in the second stage. For the South, the side payment Z marks the
revenues while it has to bear the environmental damage d(T ) caused by resource extrac-
tion. It is assumed that the South’s government lacks environmental consciousness to a
certain degree and therefore does not fully internalize the environmental harm caused by
resource extraction, which, however, is fully perceived by the society of the South. One
example for this assumption is the Peruvian government which approved the expansion
plans of the Camisea gas project despite its threatening the lives of the indigenous peo-
ple (Feather, 2014). Another example is the Bijola Mining Area in Rajasthan, India,
where various minerals are extracted. The case study by Chauhan (2010) describes
the consequences of mining with regard to deforestation, habit destruction, biodiversity
erosion and air and water pollution for workers and inhabitants. Licenses for mining
are nevertheless distributed by the government. Based on the argumentation of, a.o.,
Arvin and Lew (2011), the degree of environmental consciousness is assumed to behave
16This assumption is based on Porter (1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995), who argue that
innovations resulting from well-designed environmental regulations can enhance competitiveness. Am-
bec et al. (2011) provide a survey of the theoretical and empirical support for the Porter hypothesis.
Additional empirical support for Porter’s hypothesis can be found in the Business Risk Report for the
Mining and Metals Industry for 2012 - 2013 (Ernst&Young, 2012) and in the mining sector, which
promotes the application of clean technology (CleanMiningAlliance, 2012).
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in a proportional manner to the development of democratic institutions of a country.
Hence, the internalization of the environmental damage depends on the degree of de-
mocratization ω in the South with ω ∈ (0, 1). Thus, the government of the South aims
at maximizing its payoff function
GS = Z − ωd(T )R.
I assume that the partners engage in Nash-bargaining to determine the size of the side
payment Z∗ as well as of the amount of resources to extract R∗, such that the Nash-
product
N = (GN −OON )(GS −OOS) (2)
is maximized. The countries’ excess utilities consist of their respective payoff functions
Gi minus the outside options OOi. By finding the Nash-bargaining solution, the joint
payoff G = GN +GS with
G(T, ω) = p(R)R− a(T )R− ωd(T )R (3)
is simultaneously maximized.
Solving the model backwards, the partners jointly determine the level of R in the
second stage of the game, such that the joint payoff function in equation (3) is maximized.
The equilibrium resource level R∗ with
R∗(T, ω) =
v − a(T )− ωd(T )
2b
(4)
leads to a joint payoff of
G∗(T, ω) =
(v − a(T )− ωd(T ))2
4b
= bR∗2. (5)
Both functions depend on the quality of the extraction technology T provided by the
North and the degree of democratization ω in the South. The extraction technology
is to be determined endogenously in the first stage of the game while the state of the
democracy is taken as exogenous to the setting of the resource partnership.
In the first stage of the game, the North determines its investment level for the
provision of the extraction technology T in the partnership. In equilibrium, the North
supplies the quality of extraction technology that maximizes its profit function. Im-
plementing Z∗ as the level of the side payment that maximizes the Nash-Product in
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equation (2) into the North’s payoff function GN (1) and subtracting the investment
costs s(T ) gives the North’s profit function piN with
piN (T, ω) =
G∗(T, ω)
2
+
OON (T, ω)−OOS(T, ω)
2
− s(T ). (6)
The outside options for the two partners are defined as OON = ωMT and OOS =
(1− ω)MT , where M is the market price per quality unit of technology. They describe
the respective alternative payoffs for the North and the South in case of a breakdown
of the resource partnership. That is, if no bargaining solution is reached in the second
stage of the game and hence no resources are being extracted, the only option to earn
revenue is to sell the extraction technology that has been provided by the North. De-
pending on the quality of the property rights protection in the South, the North faces a
risk of expropriation concerning its investment. Hence, the quality of the property rights
determines which of the partners owns the extraction technology and is able to earn rev-
enues in the case of a failure of the partnership. In correspondence to the argumentation
of Knutsen (2011), ω, the state of democracy, serves as an indicator for the quality of
property rights protection in the South. Therewith, (1 − ω) gives the probability of
expropriation for the North. The risk of expropriation is higher in less democratic host
countries, i.e. for a lower value of ω. Thereby, an inversely proportional relationship
between the risk of expropriation and democratic institutions is assumed. In the end,
the degree of democratization in the South determines the size of the bargaining power
of both partners.
The North’s decision on the quality of the extraction technology supplied depends
on the risk of expropriation and its expected profit. Hypothetically, if contracts were
complete and hence the risk of expropriation eliminated, the North would provide an
extraction technology of quality
TCC(ω) =
(v −A− ωD)(α+ ωδ)
2bχ− (α+ ωδ)2 , (7)
such that the joint profit function pi = G∗ − s(T ) was maximized (I call this the “Com-
plete Contracts” Case). In equilibrium, however, the North provides an extraction tech-
nology of quality T eq, depicted below, which maximizes its own profit function, stated
in equation (6).
T eq(ω) =
(v −A− ωD)(α+ ωδ)
4bχ− (α+ ωδ)2 +
(ω − 12)M
χ− 14b(α+ ωδ)2
(8)
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When comparing the first term of the equilibrium quality level of the extraction tech-
nology in equation (8) with the higher level given in equation (7) the occurrence of a
holdup problem becomes obvious.17 With better property rights protection and a better
outside option of the North, the holdup problem can be reduced, i.e. the second term
of equation (8) increases.
In the subsequent analysis, I start my investigation of the environmental outcome of
the resource partnership with a simplified version of the model, notated as “Benchmark”,
in which the outside options are assumed to be equal to zero (M = 0), giving the North
a profit function of piN =
1
2G
∗(ω, T )−s(T ). In equilibrium a “Benchmark” technological
quality of
T˜ eq(ω) =
(v −A− ωD)(α+ ωδ)
4bχ− (α+ ωδ)2 (9)
is obtained. In the later part of section 3.2, the scenario “Outside Options” extends
upon the “Benchmark” case by including the outside options of both partners. Then
the simplifying assumption of zero outside options is relaxed leading to the equilibrium
outcome with T = T eq, as defined in equation (8). The distinction between the three
cases helps identifying the separate effects and mechanisms occurring in the model.
For one, the “Complete Contracts” case gives the optimal outcome such as a social
planner would arrange it and serves as a point of reference. In the “Benchmark” scenario
the consequences of the lack of environmental consciousness on behalf of the South’s
government can be observed. Finally, the inclusion of outside options in the third
scenario allows illustrating the consequences of poor property rights protection for the
environment.
3 The Environment in Resource Partnerships
The quality of the extraction technology applied in the resource partnership crucially
affects the resulting state of the South’s environment. As indicated above, the environ-
mental quality is a function of the quantity of resources extracted and the technology
applied, with the former also being a function of the latter and both variables depending
on the democracy level ω, i.e
E = f (R(T (ω), ω);T (ω)) .
17Only in the case of perfect democracy, i.e. with ω = 1, and if the North has a large outside option
with OON = MT = G
∗, will the North choose the TCC as equilibrium level of technological quality.
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The function can be specified as
E = e¯− d(T (ω))R(T (ω), ω), (10)
with e¯ being the initial endowment of environmental quality available in the South.
Equation (10) reflects the influence of resource extraction on the environment. Figure
II.1 illustrates this relationship . First, we focus on panel a). In the graph at the top
with the downward-sloping demand function for the final good, p(Q), with the corre-
sponding marginal revenue, MR, the amount of resource extraction is determined. Since
the production of the final good solely depends on its input R, I stay with the notation
for natural resources, R, in the figure. In the figure I assume for simplicity in illustration
that the resource-extracting monopolist not only accounts for the marginal extraction
costs a(T ), but also fully internalizes the marginal environmental damage d(T ) occur-
ring from resource extraction when determining the resource extraction rate. That is, I
neglect the role of democracy at this stage of analysis and consider the socially optimal
outcome. In correspondence to the Hotelling rule (1931), both types of marginal costs
are considered to be independent of the size of the stock of reserves remaining in the
ground. That is, given for a certain quality of the extraction technology, the marginal
costs of both types of extraction costs are constant. The marginal social costs µ(T ),
i.e. the sum of marginal extraction costs and marginal environmental damage, decrease
with the application of a better technology. Let us assume that extraction technology
of quality T0, depicted by the black lines, is applied, giving the equilibrium extraction
level of R(T0). The lower graph illustrates the negative relationship between resource
extraction and the environmental quality, as defined in equation (10). An increase in the
quantity of resources extracted raises pollution and hence diminishes the environmental
quality. With the full consideration of the marginal social costs µ(T ), an environmental
level of E(T0) is obtained. The combination of both graphs in panel a) depicts the
resource extraction level with the corresponding environmental quality for a given ex-
traction technology under full internalization of the environmental damage. Now, let us
assume in a second step that an improved technology T1 is applied. The cleaner and
more efficient new extraction technology T1, illustrated by the blue lines, reduces the
marginal social costs µ(T ). The absolute size of the slope of the environmental quality
function E(T ) decreases due to the reduction in d(T ). The introduction of the cleaner
technology T1 raises environmental quality. Despite the higher extraction rate, the abso-
lute amount of pollution emitted is reduced, leading to an overall higher environmental
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Figure II.1: The environmental impact of resource extraction
quality. However, in panel b) of figure II.1, a case in which the environment is harmed
by the introduction of an improved extraction technology is presented. If the improved
technology initiates a relatively larger reduction in a(T ) compared to the reduction in
d(T ) or if the demand for resources is fairly elastic, the new situation proves to be
environmentally detrimental. The higher extraction rate emerging from the improved
extraction technology eliminates the environmental gains from the cleaner technology.
In correspondence to Smulders and Di Maria (2012), such a technology can be defined
as a brown technology, or pollution-using instead of pollution-saving.
3.1 The Relevance of the Technological Quality
The intuition graphically depicted in figure II.1 is supported by the comparative statics
analyzing the effect of an improvement in the extraction technology on the environment.
We start with the comparative statics of the second stage equilibrium, taking the quality
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of the extraction technology as exogenous for now. It can be shown that the impact
of an improvement in the applied extraction technology on the environment is twofold.
On the one hand, per definition, a cleaner technology reduces the marginal damage per
resource extracted by
∂d(T )
∂T
= −δ < 0,
as can be seen in the flattening of the environment function in the lower graph of figure
II.1. On the other hand, partially differentiating equation (4) shows that the extraction
rate is raised with an improved extraction technology by
∂R
∂T
=
α+ ωδ
2b
> 0. (11)
The extraction rate is increased by the amount of the reduction in marginal social
costs initiated from the raise in technological quality (α + ωδ). A less elastic demand
function for the final high-technology good, i.e. a large value of b and consequently more
market power for the North, reduces the impact of a rise in technological quality on the
extraction rate.
As a consequence of these contradicting effects, the partial derivative ∂E∂T shows that
the impact of an improved technology on the environmental quality is ambiguous:
∂E
∂T
= −
(
∂d(T )
∂T
R+ d(T )
∂R
∂T
)
(12)
=
δ(v −A− ωD) + (α+ ωδ)(2δT −D)
2b
. (13)
While the first term in the brackets of (12) is negative, the second term is positive.
The size of d(T ) determines whether an improvement in the extraction technology is
environmentally beneficial. Specifically, rearranging equation (13) shows that the envi-
ronment only benefits from an improved extraction technology if the marginal damage
from resource extraction is sufficiently low, i.e.
∂E
∂T
> 0 if D <
δ(v −A− 2T (α+ ωδ))
2ωδ + α
. (14)
If the amount of environmental destruction caused in the extraction process is rather
small, i.e. if D is small or δ is large, an improvement in the extraction technology is
beneficial in terms of environmental quality. The improved quality of the extraction
technology not only reduces the marginal environmental damage from resource extrac-
tion but also increases the extraction rate due to reduced marginal extraction costs.
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If the aggregated amount of pollution rises since the reduction in marginal damage is
small compared to the increase in the amount of resources extracted, the application
of an improved extraction technology is overall harmful for the environment. This phe-
nomenon can be compared to the so-called rebound effect described, a.o., by Sorrell and
Dimitropoulos (2008). Transferred to the situation at hand, the concept of the rebound-
effect describes that the gain from the improvement in cleanliness is at least partially
offset by the higher extraction rate resulting from cost reduction. If the improvement
in the extraction technology improves productivity relatively more than it advances the
cleanliness of the extraction process, the overall impact on the environment is negative.
In other words, the rebound effect is the result of the application of a brown technol-
ogy. In summary, an improvement in the extraction technology can be beneficial or
detrimental to the environment. When applying a brown technology a rebound effect
occurs since the improvement of the extraction technology leads to an increase in the
extraction rate, which absorbs the reduction in marginal pollution.
3.2 The Relevance of Democracy in the South
Having analyzed the impact of an improvement in the extraction technology on the
environment, the consequences of a change in democratic institutions is now examined.
Hereby, three channels through which an improvement in democratic institutions influ-
ences the environmental quality are distinguished. First, a resource partnership under
better democratic conditions is less prone to the holdup problem. Since the North’s
outside option OON positively depends on the quality of property rights protection, an
improvement in the state of democracy ω mitigates the holdup problem. The lower risk
of expropriation grants a higher technology level in equilibrium. The consequences of
such an improvement in the extraction technology have been shown in the section above.
The second and third channels act through the rise in environmental consciousness
of the government in the resource-rich country coming along with an improvement in
the degree of democracy. To start with the second channel, I concentrate on the direct
effect from an increase in environmental awareness on the environmental quality. A
higher environmental awareness increases the degree to which the environmental damage
caused by the extraction process is internalized to the profit maximization considerations
of the South’s government. Since the resource partnership aims at maximizing the
joint payoff determined in the Nash bargaining solution, the higher degree of pollution
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internalization also influences the joint decision on the level of resource extraction. For
the analysis of this direct effect, I take the quality of the extraction technology T as
exogenously given, i.e. I analyze the comparative statics of the second stage equilibrium
of the game. The partial derivative of the resource extraction function given in equation
(4) with respect to ω shows that an increase in the environmental awareness reduces the
amount of resources extracted by
∂R
∂ω
= −d(T )
2b
< 0.
The marginal pollution rate and the degree of the North’s market power on the final
goods market indicated by the slope of the demand function determine the size of the
impact of a rising democracy index on the level of resource extraction. Inserting the
equilibrium extraction level derived in equation (4) into the environment function (10)
and taking the partial derivative with respect to ω gives
∂E
∂ω
=
(d(T ))2
2b
> 0,
which shows the improvement in the environmental quality resulting from a raise in
environmental awareness. The larger the marginal pollution d(T ) caused by resource
extraction, the larger the effects on both variables. Similar to the analysis of the impact
of an improvement in the extraction technology, more market power resulting from a
relatively inelastic demand curve leads to less of a reduction in the extraction rate
initiated by the increase in ω. Consequently, the absolute effect of democratization on
the environmental quality is also reduced. Hence, if the extraction technology were
independent of the environmental consciousness of the government in the resource-rich
country, the process of democratization would clearly lead to a lower equilibrium level
of extracted resources resulting in a higher environmental quality.
However, the degree of environmental consciousness in the South also affects the
North’s investment decision for the extraction technology. This is the third channel
portrayed. When including the first stage of the modeled game, with the endogenously
determined level of the extraction technology, it can be observed that the environmen-
tal awareness also has an “indirect” impact on the environment through the channel
of the equilibrium extraction technology. In order to focus on the effect from a rise
in environmental consciousness on the North’s technology choice, I continue with the
“Benchmark” case without outside options to exclude the property rights impact from
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democratization. Hence, the extraction technology of quality T˜ eq, as defined in equation
(9), is applied as equilibrium technology. The total impact of an improvement in the
South’s environmental awareness on the North’s investment choice can be seen when
totally differentiating the North’s profit function with respect to ω. I.e. ∂piN∂ω gives
dT˜ eq
dω
= −
∂x
∂ω
∂x
∂T
with
x ≡ ∂piN
∂T
= bR∗(T, ω)
∂R∗
∂T
− ∂s
∂T
for OON = OOS = 0, (15)
where the asterisk denotes the equilibrium level of a variable. The denominator of (15)
gives the second order condition, which is negative by assumption. The derivative with
respect to ω,
∂x
∂ω
= b
∂R∗
∂ω
∂R∗
∂T
+ bR∗
∂2R∗
∂T∂ω
≶ 0, (16)
consists of a negative first term and a positive second term. Hence, the impact of
democratization on the extraction technology given in equation (15) is ambiguous. In
equation (17) it is shown that, as a consequence, the total impact of democratization
on the extraction level is also ambiguous since it depends directly on the relationship
between T and ω:
∂R(T ∗)
∂ω
=
∂R
∂T ∗
∂T ∗
∂ω
+
∂R∗
∂ω
≶ 0. (17)
The impact of democratization on the environment depends on both of these effects:
that of democratization on the extraction technology as well as on resource extraction.
As a result, the effect of democratization on the environment, depicted in equation (18),
∂E(T ∗)
∂ω
= −δ ∂T
∗
∂ω
R∗ − d(T )∂R(T
∗)
∂ω
≶ 0, (18)
can also not be uniquely determined. Intuitively, the internalization of the environmen-
tal damage, on the one hand, induces the investment into a cleaner technology for cost
reduction. On the other hand, however, having a cleaner and simultaneously more pro-
ductive technology leads to a higher extraction rate, which might increase the absolute
level of pollution. Due to the higher environmental awareness, this pollution level is
included to a larger degree as a cost into the profit function of the resource partnership.
Hence, a lower investment in the extraction technology should be expected.
When having a look at the specified model including the outside options, the re-
sult of not having a clear-cut relationship between the extraction technology T eq and
33
democratization ω can be confirmed. As in equation (15), totally differentiating piN
of equation (6) with respect to ω, i.e. taking the derivative of T eq with respect to ω
shows the full impact of democratization on the North’s profit function determining its
investment decision. Analytically, the derivative in equation (19) cannot be uniquely
determined to be positive or negative:
∂T eq
∂ω
=
2δ(v −A− ωD)(α+ ωδ)2 + 8δb2M(ω − 12)(α+ ωδ)
(4bχ− (α+ ωδ)2)2
+
4bM −D(α+ ωδ) + δ(v −A− ωD)
(4bχ− (α+ ωδ)2) . (19)
An improvement in the South’s democratic institutions is accompanied by an increase in
the North’s investment into the extraction technology only if the environmental damage
of resource extraction is small, i.e. for
D < 2δT eq
(α+ ωδ) + 2bδ(α+ ωδ)
α+ 2ωδ
+
4bM + δ(v −A)
α+ 2ωδ
. (20)
Hence, I call this inequality the North’s “investment condition”. The size of the en-
vironmental damage is again the decisive factor. After having been identified as the
factor that tips the scales in favor of or against a green technology, the environmental
damage is now the crucial factor shaping the investment behavior of the North in regard
of democratization.
In a nutshell, it was shown in section 3 that the effect from extracting natural re-
sources on the environment depends on whether a green or a brown extraction technology
is being applied. Equations (13) and (14) show that the classification into a green versus
a brown technology mainly depends on the size of the marginal environmental damage
caused by resource extraction. I continued by showing that in the setting of the resource
partnership, the degree of democratization influences the size of the investment in the
extraction technology and therewith the quality of technology applied in the extraction
process. A clear-cut relationship between the democratic condition of a resource-rich
country and its environmental quality cannot, however, be determined in the analytical
analysis.
4 Numerical Simulation
A numerical simulation, based on the specified model, helps with visualizing the possible
outcomes from democratization in the resource partnership setting in order to substan-
tiate the analytical findings. In analogy to the analytical analysis, I start by classifying
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an extraction technology as either green or brown. Then, I continue by visualizing the
quality of the extraction technology and its impact on the environment. All results are
portrayed in dependence on the South’s state of democracy. Based on the findings of
the theoretical model presented above, three distinctive cases are constructed, for which
the numerical simulations are conducted. These cases serve as examples to illustrate
the effects of a resource partnership but do not claim to capture the whole range of
possible outcomes. The values for the parameters in all three cases are chosen such that
the conditions derived from the analytical model, which are listed in the appendix, are
satisfied. The chosen parametric values are also depicted in the appendix.
The three cases simulated in the following differ in two aspects. First, the three
possible relationships between democratization and the quality of the extraction tech-
nology are covered, which are either increasing, decreasing, or inversely U-shaped. In
the analytical part it was shown that the condition stated in inequality (20) determines
the sign of this relationship. The finding in equation (18) reveals the importance of
this relationship since it also determines the impact of ω on the environment. Secondly,
the analytical part exposes the size of the marginal environmental damage as a decisive
factor for the development of the environmental quality. Hence, the relative size of en-
vironmental damage to extraction costs is also addressed in these three cases. Case (1)
is considered as the “symmetric” case, where both extraction costs and environmental
damage contribute to equal parts to the size of marginal social costs. In this case the
process of democratization always gives an incentive to the North to invest more into the
extraction technology. Hence, the condition of inequality (20) is satisfied, guaranteeing
a positive relationship between ω and T . Case (2) puts additional emphasis on the en-
vironmental damage by increasing the marginal environmental destruction costs D, and
also the marginal damage reduction δ, over the marginal extraction costs of a(T ). In
this case the investment condition stated in inequality (20) is only met for small values
of ω. An inversely U-shaped relationship between T and ω can be observed. In Case
(3) the values are chosen such that a negative relationship between technological quality
and democratization appears. As in Case (2), the marginal environmental damage also
constitutes the main share of the marginal social costs. While in both cases the emphasis
is laid upon large environmental damage, in contrast to Case (2), the marginal reduc-
tion in the environmental destruction, δ, through the improvement in the extraction
technology is relatively small in Case (3).
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Figure II.2: Quality of Extraction Technology
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The three graphs displayed in figure II.2 classify the equilibrium extraction technol-
ogy for Cases (1) through (3) (from top to bottom) in the “Benchmark” scenario as a
green versus a brown technology. In dependence on the progress of democratization, the
impact of an improvement in the applied extraction technology on the environment is
pictured. On the vertical axis the marginal change in the environmental quality resulting
from a marginal improvement in the quality of the extraction technology ∂E∂T is plotted.
The independent variable on the horizontal axis gives the degree of democratization.
The dotted line at zero represents the border between a green and a brown technology.
Hence, above this line, an improvement in T is beneficial for the environment, below it is
detrimental. As defined in equation (13), if the impact of an improvement in the extrac-
tion technology is positive for the environment, the new technology is classified as green,
otherwise it is brown. It can be seen that in Case (1), a green technology is applied. In
Case (3) the technology is practically always brown, independent of the state of democ-
racy in the South. In Case (2) the technology turns brown as democratization proceeds.
The larger the size of environmental damage relative to the extraction costs of resource
extraction, the more likely it is that an improvement in the extraction technology will
harm the environment. It is striking that an improvement in the state of democracy
always worsens the effect of an improvement in technology on the environment. The
larger the degree of internalizing the environmental damage, the worse the impact of an
improvement in the extraction technology on the environment. Intuitively, the marginal
environmental benefit of an improvement in the quality of the extraction technology
decreases when the level of democracy rises since democratization has simultaneously a
negative effect on the extraction rate.
Figure II.3 presents the relationships between the quality of the extraction technol-
ogy, the environment, and democracy for the three cases introduced above. In each
of the graphs of figure II.3, three lines depict the development of the dependent vari-
ables, the extraction technology (in the upper row) and the environmental quality (in
the bottom row), during the process of democratization in the South. The “Complete
Contracts” and “Benchmark” scenarios are depicted with the light and dark solid lines,
respectively. The gap between these solid lines reflects the holdup problem. The inclu-
sion of “Outside Options”, illustrated with the black dashed lines, allows for bridging
this gap by increasing property rights protection.
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The simulations of Case (1) are illustrated in the first column (after rotating the
page) of figure II.3 and paint the picture as intuitively expected. Democratization
increases the environmental awareness and thus provides incentives to invest into a
cleaner technology. Democratization has decreasing marginal effects in that respect.
The holdup problem, visualized by the gap between the “Complete Contacts” versus the
“Benchmark” lines, leads to a less productive and dirtier technology. The dashed line,
which depicts the inclusion of outside options in comparison to the “Benchmark” case,
shows that the improvement in democratization reallocates bargaining power from the
South to the North. The improvement in property rights protection reduces the risk of
expropriation for the North. The outside option of the North is consequently enhanced,
bridging the investment gap. The degree to which this gap is bridged depends on the
size of the outside option. In the lower graph, it can be seen that the environment
benefits enormously from democratization. With the light solid line lying above the
dark solid line, the holdup problem is transferred to the resulting environmental quality.
Overall, the initiation of a cleaner extraction technology from the mitigation of the
holdup problem combined with the internalization of pollution elevates the level of the
environmental quality.
In the second column, the second combination of parametric values demonstrates
that the situation is generally not as straightforward as the picture painted in Case (1)
suggests. In this intermediate case, an increase in the democracy index ω first leads to
an improvement in the equilibrium quality of the extraction technology. However, after
a certain degree of democratization the impact turns negative. This inverse-U-shaped
relationship results from not strictly meeting one side of the investment condition of
inequality (20) for the full range of ω ∈ (0, 1). After a certain threshold and due to the
large marginal environmental damage, the internalization of pollution more than offsets
the gains from higher revenues with the higher extraction level resulting in a reduced
investment into T . The impact of democratization on the environmental quality is
again clearly positive. It can, however, be observed that the application of a better,
i.e. also cleaner, extraction technology resulting from the mitigation of the holdup
problem, does not necessarily lead to a higher level of environmental quality. The
crossing of the lines in the lower graph of column two pictures the rebound effect,
which is caused by the application of a brown resource extraction technology (see figure
II.2). In this case, under a relatively large marginal environmental burden from the
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resource extraction process, the higher extraction level coming along with the cleaner
extraction procedure under “Complete Contracts” harms the environment more than the
comparably dirtier technology in the “Benchmark” model does. That is, the reduction
in marginal environmental destruction is more than offset from the higher extraction
level initiated by the simultaneously more productive extraction technology.
A distinction between the application of a “Benchmark” versus the “Complete Con-
tracts” technology is barely visible in the third case depicted in the third column. In
order to fulfill the reverse condition of inequality (20), the level of technological quality
is so low that the holdup problem for the outcome of environmental quality becomes
practically irrelevant. Especially in the simulation for environmental quality, all three
lines almost completely overlap. Nevertheless, an interesting finding can be stated. De-
spite the negative relationship between the quality of the extraction technology and de-
mocratization, the relationship between environmental quality and democracy remains
positive. In the numerical simulation no proof for an ambiguous relationship between
democratization and the environment can be found. This contradicts the apparent am-
biguity found in the analytical analysis of equation (18). Combining the findings from
the numerical simulations in figures II.2 and II.3 one can observe that the North reduces
its investment into the extraction technology when the process of democratization leads
to the application of a brown technology. This mechanism ensures a positive relationship
between the state of democracy and the environment. The driver for both developments
is the large environmental damage caused by resource extraction. Apparently, an in-
crease in the South’s environmental awareness always benefits the environment, even if it
leads to a lower quality in the extraction technology. The gain from improving environ-
mental awareness initiated by the process of democratization dominates the enhanced
investment incentive resulting from the mitigation of the holdup problem.
5 Conclusion
The formation of a resource partnership between a resource-dependent firm and a
resource-rich country may solve the input shortage in natural resources for companies
in industrialized nations and enable developing countries to earn revenue from their
wealth in natural resources. However, the process of resource extraction may destruct
the local environment. The degree of environmental damage depends on the quantity
of resources extracted and the quality of the extraction technology applied for the ex-
40
traction process. The incomplete nature of resource extraction contracts as well as the
lack of environmental consciousness by the South’s government cause the application of
a suboptimal extraction technology. Based on the endogenously determined extraction
technology, the environmental quality is identified in dependence of the state of democ-
racy in the resource-rich country. The paper answers two successive questions in order
to determine the impact from forming a resource partnership on the environment. For
one (i), how does an improvement in the extraction technology affect the environment
of a resource-rich country? And (ii), what extraction technology is provided and applied
in dependence of the degree of democratization in the resource-rich country? Combin-
ing these questions, the equilibrium level of environmental quality is determined. The
following summarizes the answers found in my analysis:
(i) The application of an improved resource extraction technology is only beneficial
to the environment if the new technology can be qualified as a green technology. The
distinction between a green and a brown technology depends on the relationship of the
marginal reduction in extraction costs versus the marginal reduction in environmental
damage resulting from the improvement in the extraction technology. A rebound effect
occurs when a brown technology is applied and, consequently, the gains for the environ-
mental quality earned from the cleaner extraction technology are more than offset by
the higher resource extraction level resulting from the higher productivity of the new
technology.
(ii) In a resource partnership, the quality of the applied extraction technology is
determined by the size of the North’s investment. Two externalities, the imperfect
property rights protection and the lack of environmental valuation in the South, influ-
ence the North’s incentive regarding its investment into the extraction technology. Both
externalities, influencing the equilibrium extraction technology, are mitigated by an im-
provement in the democracy of the resource-rich country. Since the equilibrium extrac-
tion technology applied in the resource partnership depends on the South’s democracy,
so does the environmental level. In the analysis, the total impact of the democratization
process is divided into its components. First, the rise in environmental consciousness
has a direct effect which leads to a lower extraction rate and a consequently higher level
of environmental quality. Second, the environmental consciousness also influences the
North’s decision on the quality of the supplied extraction technology. On the one hand,
the internalization of the environmental damage induces the firm to invest into a cleaner
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technology reducing the marginal damage of resource extraction. On the other hand,
a cleaner technology increases the extraction level due to the gains in efficiency. The
overall effect from democratization on the environment is ambiguous. Third, a raise in
democratization mitigates the holdup problem through improved property rights protec-
tion and therewith causes the application of a better extraction technology. Hence, the
findings stated in result (i) are also rooted in the process of democratization. Overall, the
full impact of democratization on the investment incentive is found to be ambiguous and
mainly depends on the size of the marginal environmental destruction caused during the
extraction process. However, the numerical simulation conducted in section 4 confirmed
the intuitive assumption of a positive relationship between the process of democratiza-
tion and environmental quality. That is, even in the case in which democratization leads
to the application of a brown technology due to a large marginal environmental damage
from resource extraction, the rise in environmental valuation excels the increase in the
investment incentive, such that the North’s investment in the extraction technology is
reduced if the extraction technology turns brown. Hence, the gains from the improve-
ment in environmental awareness due to democratization virtually outperform the rise
in investment incentive resulting from the mitigation of the holdup problem.
The main finding of this paper states that, at least for the cases covered in the
numerical simulations, an improvement in the state of the South’s democracy is always
beneficial in terms of environment protection in a North-South investment relationship
in the extractive sector. This finding suggests itself to be applied to an assessment of the
different development cooperation objectives of traditional investors in comparison to
China as a new investor, e.g. in Africa. Arguing in line with the findings of this paper,
conditioning investments on improvements in the institutional setting of host countries,
in fact, has a positive impact on the protection of the local environment and can be
regarded as beneficial, especially to the rural population.
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6 Appendix
Analytical Conditions:
a(T ) = A− αT > 0
d(T ) = D − δT > 0
p(Q) = v − bQ > 0
s(T ) =
1
2
χT 2 > 0
T (ω) > 0 :
(v −A− ωD) > 0
2bχ− (α+ ωδ)2 > 0
(α+ ωδ)2
4b
< χ (s.o.c.)
E > 0 :
e > d(T ∗)R∗
Description Parameter Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Demand curve v 100 100 100
b 5 10 10
Production costs A 25 5 5
α 1 3 0.1
Environmental costs D 25 90 90
δ 1 5 0.1
Sunk costs χ 5 5 5
Environmental stock e¯ 450 450 450
Outside options M 3 3 0.05
Table II.A1: Values of Parameters for the Numerical Simulation
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III Part III
Forest Loss from Oil Activities: A Matter of Democ-
racy
Hanna Krings, James Cust,1 Torfinn Harding2
Abstract
By 2010, 17% of all global onshore oil and gas exploration wells had been drilled
in forests. In the vicinity of such wells, the rate of forest loss after drilling is twice
as high in undemocratic countries as in democratic countries (73% versus 35% of
the forest is lost over a period of ten years). We find no evidence of less forest
loss around wells operated by firms with supposedly strong corporate governance,
underlining the determining role of political governance.
JEL classification: F64, Q57
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1 Introduction and Main Findings
New studies have suggested that the world’s forests could be under threat from fossil
fuel and minerals extraction (Allred et al., 2015; Butt et al., 2013). These developments
are particularly worrying for tropical forests, as they have high bio-diversity, play impor-
tant roles as carbon sinks, and are often located in countries with political institutions
less able to protect the forests (Butt et al., 2013). The threat to these forests would
grow further if the global oil industry shifted its historical focus from exploration and
extraction in countries with strong institutions (Cust and Harding, 2014) to countries
with weaker institutions, as a recent study argues has already begun to happen (Arezki
et al., 2016).
The Obama administration’s rejection of the Keystone XL pipeline in the U.S. ex-
emplifies the role strong democratic institutions can play in limiting the environmental
impacts of oil activities. The rejection was preceded by pressure from activists and
politicians in Congress (Time Magazine, 2015). In contrast, Peru has been criticized for
paying too little attention to its indigenous people and the local environment during ex-
pansions of its oil exploration (The Economist, 2008; Finer et al., 2013), while Indonesia
has grabbed international headlines due to alleged corruption in a project seeking to
clean up toxic substances around wells drilled by Chevron (Financial Times, 2012; The
Wall Street Journal, Murray Hiebert, 2014).
Our analysis provides, to the best of our knowledge, the first global evidence on
the roles of democracy and company characteristics for the impacts of oil activities on
the local environment. The sample covers forest loss in the period 2001-2013 near 3331
oil and gas (hereafter “oil”) exploration wells drilled in forest in the period 2004-2010.
The wells are drilled in 62 different countries, spanning the entire spectrum of different
democracy scores. We first estimate that the wells are associated with forest loss. This
has previously been shown only for the U.S. and Canada (Allred et al., 2015). We
then show that the forest loss related to oil activities is much higher in undemocratic
countries than in democratic countries. Finally, we find no evidence that companies from
democratic countries, or companies with other characteristics believed to be associated
with high standards of corporate governance, operate wells with systematically lower
forest loss. Our findings point to the central role of political governance in reducing
local environmental hazards from fossil fuel extraction.
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Oil activities and forest loss. Ecosystem functions including wildlife habitat, bio-
diversity and landscape connectivity are threatened by oil activities (Allred et al., 2015;
Finer et al., 2008; Finer and Orta-Martinez, 2010; Rooney et al., 2012). In the prepara-
tion of new locations for oil drilling, areas of forest often have to be cleared. Clearance
may initially be driven by the space required for drilling equipment as well as the con-
struction of access roads and accommodation. In the event of a commercial discovery,
the project may transition from exploration to development, attracting increased invest-
ments and construction of the facilities and infrastructure required. Where exploration
activities open up previously inaccessible regions, they may also create opportunities for
others to engage in economic activities that lead to further clearance, such as commer-
cial as well as illegal logging. All these activities may also lead to local pollution, such
as spillage of chemicals. Earlier work has estimated a considerable environmental foot-
print from oil and gas drilling in central Canada and the U.S., due to well pads, roads,
and storage facilities (Allred et al., 2015). An emerging literature discusses similar local
environmental effects of shale gas developments in the U.S. (Muehlenbachs et al., 2015).
The role of democracy. For developing countries, there is a difficult trade-off be-
tween opening up new areas for oil activities that might drive increased economic growth
on the one hand, and risking severe environmental impacts on the other. The property
rights to sub-soil resources and associated revenues are entrusted to the state in most
countries, whereas negative environmental impacts are felt by local communities and the
global community. Political institutions are key in balancing the different concerns and
supporting conditions for environmental safeguards. There is an abundance of anecdotes
related to mineral and fossil fuel extraction where environmental concerns have formed
a key part of local communities demands and influence over company and government
behavior (The Economist, 2016). However, such influence requires political rights and
accountability mechanisms. One study pointed to the importance of weak governance
in exacerbating deforestation in Indonesia, by allowing local politicians and bureaucrats
to extract rents related to deforestation instead of preserving the forest (Burgess et al.,
2012). In countries at the other end of the democratic spectrum, companies are required
to restore the local environment and engage in conservation activities. In Canada, where
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) are mandatory to ensure active mitigation
plans are pursued, oil companies have engaged in reforestation programs where more
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than 12 million trees have been planted (Poveda, 2015).
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Figure III.1: Oil drilling over time and forest loss vs. democracy scores
Oil exploration in forested areas. Figure III.1, left hand panel, shows the frequency
of exploration drilling for petroleum resources, split between drilling in wild forests, in
other types of forests, in remaining onshore biomes, and offshore. From 1950 onwards,
the global count of wells increases considerably in our dataset. There was a wave of forest
drilling from the 1960s through to the 1980s, while forest drilling was comparatively low
in the 1990s and 2000s. This may change in the future, as many unexplored areas are
in forests (Butt et al., 2013). By 2010, 17% of all onshore wells lie in forested areas in
our data, whereas 31% of the landmass on the globe was forested in 2013 (Food and
Agriculture Organization, 2016). Some forested areas have seen much exploration, e.g.
the western Amazon Basin, a region that is known to be exceptionally biologically rich
[see supplementary materials (SM)]. The right hand panel of figure III.1 illustrates the
main finding of this paper: undemocratic countries have higher forest loss around their
wells, and democratic countries have lower forest loss around their wells.
Forest loss at exploration wells. Figure III.2 displays the forest loss in the imme-
diate 1 sq km vicinity of exploration wells, covering nine years before and nine years
after the drilling year. The left hand panel is for all wells, which have an average forest
loss of 4.1% per year after drilling, summing up to 41.4% over ten years (SM). The right
hand panel shows that the forest loss is much higher in host countries with low democ-
racy scores (such as Angola, Mexico and Mozambique) than in host countries with high
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Figure III.2: Forest loss before and after exploration drilling
democracy scores (such as Australia, Brazil and Chile; see SM for details).
In both panels, the pattern of forest loss is consistent with clearance in preparation
for exploration drilling, removal of forest related to the drilling itself, and high annual
forest loss in the years after a well is drilled due to increased activities in the area.
In undemocratic countries, there is also additional forest loss most likely related to
extraction of oil, as Arezki et al. (2016) find it takes on average about five years after
discovery for extraction to start.
Oil discoveries as natural experiment. In our set-up, wells with and without
discoveries should hold the same ex ante likelihood of striking oil (SM). By comparing
forest loss around discovery wells and non-discovery wells, we estimate the causal effect
of oil discovery on forest loss. 68% of the exploration wells in our data lead to a discovery
of oil, without any systematic differences with respect to democracy scores (SM).
For a country with a low democracy score like Angola’s, we estimate that a non-
discovery well is associated with 24.2% forest loss in the 1 sq km vicinity, whereas a
discovery well leads to an additional 48.5 percentage points of forest loss, or 72.7%
all together. In a country with a high democracy score like Canada’s, a discovery
actually leads to lower forest loss than a non-discovery, 35.3% versus 47.0%. A potential
explanation for this result is restoration and conservation efforts undertaken by operating
companies, such as those reported by Canada’s Oil Sands Innovation Alliance (COSIA,
2016).
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Company types. Pressure from shareholders, customers and opinion makers may
affect how much a company seeks to protect the environment in the course of its ac-
tivities. We investigate a list of company characteristics, such as the democracy level
in their country of origin, public listing on a stock exchange and status as a superma-
jor international oil company (the seven IOCs are: BP, Shell, Chevron, ExxonMobil,
Total, Eni and ConocoPhillips). We reject that such characteristics are systematically
associated with different impacts of oil discovery on forest loss across the wells in our
sample (SM). We also find that these company characteristics on average do not alter the
influence of host-country democracy. These findings have two, equally valid, interpre-
tations: i) presumptively “responsible” companies appear to behave no differently than
other companies or ii) the circumstances related to weak democratic institutions in the
drilling-locations are hard to overcome even for presumptively “responsible” companies.
Looking forwards Our results point to the importance of democracy in limiting
the environmental footprint of resource extraction in forests. The large variation in
democracy scores across countries reflects varying degrees of constraints on the executive
branch of government, political competition, freedom of speech and accountability of
decision making. Citizens and organizations in democracies may be better able to voice
environmental concerns and prompt the introduction and enforcement of policies to
protect the environment. Our results are in line with a large economics literature that
have found well-functioning and inclusive political institutions to be critical for economic
development (Acemoglu et al., 2005).
A surprising result in our study is that the forest loss in the wake of an oil discovery
on average does not depend on which company is in charge of the operation. Companies
with aspirations to minimize their impact on the local environment may need to work
harder to overcome the poor historic record of forest loss that we estimate in countries
with weak political institutions.
To date, the world may have been spared some of the more excessive environmental
damages associated with the extraction of fossil fuels, as the oil sector has been most
active in countries with high democracy scores (Cust and Harding, 2014). In the future,
the focus of investors may shift and more oil extraction could take place in forests
and in developing countries with lower democracy scores (Arezki et al., 2016). Our
findings imply that this would lead to more local damages and also raise the implied
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carbon content of a typical barrel of oil. The flip side of our finding, however, is that
governments can take on a determining role as mediators between firms and the forest,
with the upshot that huge forest loss from oil activities is not inevitable.
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2 Supplementary Material for
Forest Loss from Oil Activities:
A Matter of Democracy
The supplementary material includes:
2.1. Data description
2.2. Sample description
2.3. Visual inspection of the data
2.4. Econometric methodology and baseline estimation results (summary in table III.3)
2.5. Estimation results on alternative hypotheses to democracy
2.6. Robustness checks
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2.1 Data
Forest loss and tree cover Hansen et al. (2013) provide the data on global forest
cover and forest change for the period 2001-2013 based on 30m x 30m images from the
Landsat satellite. The extent of tree cover is defined as the percentage of an area that
is covered by vegetation taller than 5m. Forest loss is defined as a change from forest
to non-forest state and is recorded annually. Note that the data does not distinguish
between primary and secondary forest and that it records net forest cover loss, which
means that it includes re-growth of forest.
Forest loss is detectable from satellites and therefore available globally for a sufficient
number of years. Due to data limitations, we leave for future research to investigate
other environmental impacts such as contamination of the ground water, which has been
found to be present in the context of shale gas in the U.S. (Muehlenbachs et al., 2015).
Oil drilling The data set provided by Wood Mackenzie (2011) is considered to be
the most comprehensive existing database on oil and gas exploration drilling, covering
122375 oil and gas exploration wells across 114 countries drilled in the period 1884-2010.
For the United States, onshore wells are reported only for Alaska.
The data set distinguishes between wells that discover oil and/or gas, dry holes and
tight holes (where discovery information is kept secret). In our data set, a discovery is
defined according to the industry standard: sufficient oil or gas for commercial produc-
tion. 68% of the wells in our sample lead to discoveries (60% in the entire dataset).
Drilling an exploration well takes on average 60 days in the entire data set and 47
days in our sample. We do not observe extraction in our dataset, but Arezki et al. (2016)
report that the delay between giant oil discoveries and start of production on average is
4-6 years.
We have in this paper limited the attention to oil exploration due to the benefits
of data availability and quasi-random nature of economically viable discoveries. Future
work could look at the effects of mining and other types of resource extraction in forests.
Democracy score data The Polity IV database provides historical scores on the
quality of democracy, autocracy and executive constraints per country (The Polity IV
Project, Center for Systemic Peace, 2016). This database has good coverage in terms
of countries and years and it is widely used by economists and political scientists. The
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democracy indicator ranges from 0 (low measure) to 10 (high measure) and rates the
presence and quality of institutions that enable citizens to express preferences about al-
ternative policies, put constraints on the executive branch of government, and guarantee
civil liberties to all citizens. For our baseline estimates we use the average democracy
score in the 1990s, the preceding decade to our period of analysis, but robustness checks
show that this choice does not affect our results. When we separate between “low” and
“high” score democracies, a democracy score of 5 is taken as the threshold. Throughout
the analysis, the democracy scores of Angola (1) and Canada (10) are used as examples
of low and high scores, respectively. See table III.1 for the democracy scores across the
countries in our sample.
We focus in this paper on democracy, which is considered to be a fundamental aspect
of political institutions and found to be a fundamental driver of economic development
(Acemoglu et al., 2005). In our context, there is much anecdotal evidence suggesting
that the political voice of affected groups is directly important for reducing the local
environmental footprint. In robustness checks we show that our result also holds for
alternative measures of political institutions: the degree of autocracy, the Polity IV
database, six World Governance Indicators for the World Bank and a WEF measure of
environmental stringency (The Polity IV Project, Center for Systemic Peace, 2016; The
World Bank, 2016; World Economic Forum, 2016). Taken together, we present robust
evidence that the quality of political governance matters for the local environmental
footprint in the form of forest loss. However, given the high correlation between these
measures, it is not an easy task to conclude on which aspects of institutions is of greater
importance. We use democracy in our baseline because it is a fundamental political
institution and because of its prominence in the economics literature on institutions and
economic development.
2.2 Sample
Following Allred et al. (2015), we limit the attention to the immediate vicinity of 1 sqkm
surrounding each well (a radius of about 564 meters around each well). We include all
wells with positive tree cover in this vicinity in the year 2000, the earliest year in our
analysis. We further limit the sample to wells that were drilled between 2004 and 2010,
such that the forest loss around each well can be observed for at least three, and up to
a maximum of nine, years before and after drilling. We end up with a maximum of 62
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countries, 3331 wells and 43,303 well-year observations in our sample. Table III.1 lists
the countries, the number of wells per country, and their average democracy scores in
the 1990s.
Table III.1: Countries included in the analysis
Country # of wells Democracy score Country # of wells Democracy score
1990s 1990s
Albania 1 5.4 Italy 39 10
Angola 11 1 Kyrgyzstan 6 .
Argentina 25 7.2 Laos 1 .
Austria 2 10 Mexico 6 4.4
Australia 746 10 Morocco 4 0
Bangladesh 3 10 Mozambique 3 3.5
Bolivia 17 9 Myanmar 10 0
Brazil 549 8 Netherlands 21 10
Brunei 4 . New Zealand 60 10
Bulgaria 2 8 Nigeria 18 0.8
Cameroon 3 0.9 Pakistan 38 6.2
Canada 275 10 Papua New Guinea 36 4
Chad 6 0.5 Peru 7 3.4
Chile 3 8.1 Philippines 3 8
China 3 0 Poland 22 8.6
Colombia 363 7.8 Portugal 9 10
Congo, Rep. of 14 . Romania 32 6.5
Croatia 1 1.3 Russia 14 .
DR Congo 1 . Spain 6 10
Denmark 1 10 Sudan 3 .
Ecuador 22 8.6 Syria 1 .
Egypt 150 . Tanzania 9 1.2
France 21 9 Thailand 91 8.2
Gabon 55 0 Trinidad & Tobago 7 9.4
Germany 39 10 Turkey 138 8.6
Hungary 68 10 US (Alaska) 29 10
India 36 8.6 Uganda 38 0
Indonesia 249 1.4 Venezuela 5 .
Iraq 1 0 Vietnam 2 0
Israel 1 9.2 Yemen 1 .
total 3331
Notes: List of countries and wells used in our analysis with corresponding democracy values (averages
over 1990-1999).
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2.3 Visual inspection of the data
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Figure III.3: Distribution of tree cover around wells
Notes: The histogram in the left hand panel presents the distribution of tree cover in the year 2000
around the wells in our sample. The right hand panel presents the association between average forest
loss per well per country (horizontal axis) and the percentage forest gain (vertical axis). The latter is
calculated as the percentage of 30 x 30 m pixels in the 1 km2 vicinity around each well that in the
dataset (Hansen et al., 2013) is coded to have had some forest gain in the period 2000-2012.
The left hand panel of figure III.3 presents a histogram of the tree cover around the
wells in our sample. We include all wells with positive tree cover in the year 2000. In
column 2 of table III.10 we run a robustness check where we limit the sample to wells
with a tree cover of at least 50% in the year 2000, and our findings hold. The right hand
panel of figure III.3 indicates that accumulated forest loss of more than 100% around
some wells in our sample is associated with forest gain in the period 2000-2012. The
forest gain data from Hansen et al. (2013) is a dummy variable indicating whether a
given pixel experienced forest gain in the period 2000-2012.
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Figure III.4: Oil drilling in the western Amazon Basin
Notes: Oil exploration across selected countries in South America. Source drilling data: Wood Mackenzie
(2011)
The exceptionally biologically rich region of the western Amazon Basin, shown in
the map in figure III.4, hosts a relatively high number of exploration wells (Finer et al.,
2008). More than 1000 exploration wells have been drilled in this region in the full
dataset. 41 were drilled in our sample, out of which 29 made a discovery.
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2.4 Estimation method and baseline estimation results
Before vs. after drilling We study the annual forest loss in a 1 sqkm circle around
each well, following Allred et al. (2015). In our first regression, we compare the annual
forest loss (df) in the period after drilling with the period before drilling. The annual
forest loss is measured in percent of the 1 sqkm circle and calculated as described in
section 2.1, SM. Formally we estimate the model dfijt = β0 + β1postijt + αi + ϑt + uijt,
where i indicates the well, j indicates the country where the well is drilled and t indicates
the year in which the well was drilled. The post dummy takes value one in the year when
drilling starts and all succeeding years. αi represents well fixed effects, which control
for unobserved time-invariant characteristics that vary at the well or country level,
such as geology and geographic location. ϑt represents time fixed effects, which control
for common time-varying shocks across wells, such as the oil price. Standard errors
are clustered at the country level to take into account potential spatial and temporal
correlation in the error term uijt; across wells located in the same country and across
the years for each well.
Table III.2: Econometric estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
df df df df
post 4.139∗∗∗ 3.901∗∗∗ 4.254∗∗ 4.192∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.012) (0.012)
post x inst -0.198∗∗∗ 0.253
(0.008) (0.173)
post x disc 0.323 0.167
(0.672) (0.709)
post x disc x inst -0.670∗∗
(0.026)
N 43303 40703 40079 37986
Wells 3331 3131 3083 2922
Well-FE yes yes yes yes
Time-FE yes yes yes yes
Std. errors cluster cluster cluster cluster
Adj.R2 0.00655 0.00700 0.00659 0.00493
Notes: p-values in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Standard errors clustered at the country
level. Demeaned Polity IV variable: Impact compared to the mean democracy level. Well fixed effects
and time fixed effects are included.
The result is presented in column 1 in table III.2 and suggests that annual forest
loss is on average 4.1 percentage points higher in the years after drilling compared to
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the years before drilling. The coefficient is significant at the 1%-level. This coefficient
corresponds to the higher level of forest loss post drilling compared to before drilling
that can be seen in the left hand panel in figure 2 in the main text.
Before vs. after drilling, different levels of democracy Next we turn to the
role of democracy. We allow the coefficient on the dummy post to vary with the level
of democracy in the country where the well was drilled, instj : dfijt = β0 + β1postijt +
β2postijt × instj + αi + ϑt + uijt. Note that the effect of instj itself is already captured
by the well fixed effect. instj is measured as the difference between the democracy level
of the country in which the well is located and the mean democracy level across the
wells in our sample (the average democracy level across wells is 8). Thus, the coefficient
on post, β1, gives the increase in annual forest loss for a well with the mean democracy
level, which we estimate to be 3.9 percentage points (row 1, column 2, table III.2). A
higher democracy score is found to reduce the forest loss post drilling, as we estimate a
negative coefficient on the interaction term, β2. Moving from the mean democracy level
of 8 (like Brazil) to 10 (like Canada), decreases the average annual forest loss by about
0.4 percentage points (row 2, column 2, table III.2).
Discovery vs. non-discovery In the econometric set-up above, there may be omit-
ted variables that affect both the drilling decision and the forest loss, and hence we may
have a bias in our estimated βs (the explanatory variables of interest may be correlated
with the error term, uijt). To reduce the chance for such bias to occur, we make use of
information on whether the exploration well led to a discovery. We estimate the model:
dfijt = β0 +β1postijt+β3postijt×discijt+αi+ϑt+uijt, where discijt is a dummy taking
1 if the well leads to a discovery. Note that the effect of this dummy itself is captured
by the well fixed effect. We assume that the expected likelihood of discovering oil is the
same across all drilled wells, conditional on well and year fixed effects. The error term
uijt is then uncorrelated with the discovery dummy and the model yields an unbiased
estimate for β3. The identifying assumption of random discoveries in this setting is
similar to the assumption made by Card and Dahl (2011) in the context of baseball:
conditional on the expectations to the outcome of a game, a win/loss is random. The
expectations regarding whether a given well will lead to a discovery is determined by
geology, which is fixed over time and therefore controlled for by the well fixed effect.
58
Global changes in technology and prices are captured by year-fixed effects. Column 3
in table III.2 shows that a discovery does not have a significant effect on forest loss, on
average.
Discovery vs. non-discovery, different levels of democracy Finally we examine
the role of democracy in combination with discoveries and estimate the full model, i.e.
we include also the interaction terms post×inst and post×disc×inst. These interaction
terms should be uncorrelated with the error term as well, and reveal whether the effect
of a discovery varies with the level of democracy, or something correlated with the level
of democracy. Note that the level of democracy (as above) is measured as an average for
the 1990s, i.e. before the forest loss and the drilling we study took place and is therefore
predetermined. However, this does not affect our results, as shown in the robustness
section below. Note also that Cust and Harding (2014) present evidence that the quality
of institutions does not affect the likelihood of making a discovery. The result, presented
in column 4 in table III.2, shows that a discovery leads to significantly more forest loss
in countries with low democracy scores. This finding confirms that oil activities do lead
to more forest loss in weak democracies.
To sum up, figure 2 in the main text and columns 1 and 2 in table III.2 show
robust correlations between forest loss and oil activities. The quasi-random discoveries in
columns 3 and 4 in table III.2 help in verifying that the causality runs from oil activities
to forest loss. Utilizing discoveries is an improvement over the existing literature (Butt
et al., 2013; Allred et al., 2015), which has relied on spatial and temporal correlations.
Summary of baseline results Table III.3 summarizes our estimation results. The
first row, “before vs. after”, repeats the estimate from column 1 in table III.2. The
annual forest loss is on average 4.1 percentage points higher in the years after drilling
than in the years before drilling. In the last column, we accumulate this over the year
of drilling plus the following nine years, which amounts to an additional 41.4% of the 1
sqkm vicinity of the well being cleared of forest compared to the counterfactual of no
drilling.
In the next panel of table III.3, “before vs. after, varying democracy”, we bring
in the democracy score. Again, the first row presents the coefficient from table III.2
(column 2). We then calculate the effect for a country with a democracy score of 1 (like
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Table III.3: Summary table: Impact on forest loss
Additional forest loss in % of well-vicinity cleared
well-vicinity per year of forest over 10-year
in post-drilling period (in %) post-drilling period
Before vs. after
any well 4.139*** 41.4%
(0.002)
in mean democ. country 3.901*** 39.0%
(0.003)
Before vs. after,
in low democ. country 5.284*** 52.8%
varying democracy
(0.000)
different from mean (0.008)
in high democ. country 3.505*** 35.1%
(0.009)
different from mean (0.008)
non-discovery in mean democ. 4.192** 41.9%
(0.012)
discovery in mean democ. 4.358*** 43.6%
(0.002)
different from non-discovery (0.709)
Discovery
non-discovery in low democ. 2.420 24.2%
vs.
(0.239)
non-discovery,
discovery in low democ. 7.274*** 72.7%
varying democracy
(0.000)
different from non-discovery (0.033)
non-discovery in high democ. 4.698*** 47.0%
(0.006)
discovery in high democ. 3.526** 35.3%
(0.014)
different from non-discovery (0.062)
Notes: p-values in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. The low democracy score used in the
table is 1 (like Angola), the high score is 10 (like Canada). The average democracy score across all wells
is 8. Point estimates from table III.2: “Before vs. after” from column 1, “Before vs. after, varying inst.
quality” from column 2, “Discovery vs. non-discovery, varying inst. quality” from column 4. p-values
to test differences in accumulated forest loss are calculated with the stata command “lincom”.
Angola) and test whether the accumulated forest loss in such a country is significantly
different from the forest loss in a country with a democracy score at our sample mean of
8 (like Brazil). The row “different from the mean” reports the p-value of the test. We
find that the accumulated forest loss in the country with low democracy score is 52.8%
and that this is significantly higher than the 39.0% at the mean. The corresponding
exercise for a country with a democracy score of 10 (like Canada), yields an accumulated
forest loss of 35.1%, significantly lower than at the mean. These estimates are for all
exploration wells, regardless of whether they led to a discovery or not.
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The lower panel of of table III.3, “discovery vs. non-discovery, varying democracy”,
is based on column 4 in table III.2. First we calculate the forest loss related to non-
discovery wells and discovery wells at the mean democracy score: 41.9% vs. 43.6%,
respectively, a statistically insignificant difference. In the next rows, the corresponding
calculation for a country with a democracy score of 1 is presented, and now the forest
loss related to a discovery well is 72.7% compared to 24.2% for a non-discovery well. The
difference is statistically significant at the 4%-level. The last set of rows presents the
same for a country with a democracy score of 10, for which a discovery well is associated
with less forest loss than a non-discovery well, 47% compared to 35.3%. One explanation
could be that oil companies engage in reforestation programs (e.g., more than 12 million
trees have been planted by the oil sector in Canada (Poveda, 2015)).
Figure III.5: Reduction in tree cover around well
Notes: The figure is an alternative to figure 2 in the main text, and shows the accumulated forest loss
in the entire sample (left hand panel) and for the sample split into countries with low (< 5) and high
(5 =<) democracy scores (right hand panel). See the SM-text for more explanation).
Figure III.5 is an alternative to figure 2 in the main text and shows accumulated
forest loss based on our estimates. The left hand panel is based on the entire sample and
shows that almost 40% of the direct vicinity of a well is cleared over the entire period, on
average. The right hand panel splits the sample into countries with low (< 5) and high
(>= 5) democracy scores and shows that the forest loss for low democracy countries
is close to 100%. Note that these accumulated figures are thought experiments based
on our estimates. Only wells drilled in 2004 are observed for the drilling year plus nine
years after. For wells recorded to have positive forest loss in the period we study, the
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average tree cover in 2000 was about 35%. Figure III.3 shows that the initial tree cover
is very heterogeneous across wells.
2.5 Estimation results on alternative hypotheses to democracy
Democracy in origin country of operating company In table III.4 we investigate
if the forest loss due to discoveries depends on the democracy score of the origin country
of the drilling company. Constituencies in the origin country may exercise pressure on
companies, e.g., British Petroleum (BP) is listed on the London Stock Exchange and
under the scrutiny of shareholders and the British public at large. Companies may
also worry about their reputation among their customers, e.g., Shell’s operations in
Nigeria have regularly reached the headlines in Europe, causing potential damage to
their sales. Column 1-3 in table III.4 are based on all operating companies, with column
1 repeating our baseline estimates. Column 2 includes interaction terms between our
“treatment variable” post × disc and the democracy score in the origin country of the
operating company, which yields relatively similar results as for the interactions with
the democracy scores of the host-country (where the drilling takes place). Column 3
includes both sets of interactions and we see that the interaction term with the origin
country democracy, post× disc× foreign inst, takes a coefficient that we cannot reject
is different from zero, while the interaction term estimating the impact of the host
country’s institutions remains significant, as in our baseline results.
There is a considerable overlap between the origin country and the host-country
institutions in our sample, since many companies drill at home. To be sure that the
results above are not driven by companies from democratic countries drilling at home, we
include in column 4-6 in table III.4 only wells drilled by foreign companies, i.e. wells for
which the host-country is different than the country of origin. Column 6 reveals that the
democracy-level of the host-country is indeed the important heterogeneity and not the
democracy-level of the country of origin: the coefficient on the variable post×disc×inst
stays essentially the same as before.
In column 7 in table III.4 we include only wells drilled by domestic companies (com-
panies drilling at home). Also for this group, the variable post × disc × inst stays the
same as before (a F-test does not reject that they are the same).
In sum it seems that the democratic institutions in the country of drilling matter for
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the extent of forest loss following an oil or gas discovery. Based on table III.4, there is
little evidence that foreign companies behave differently from domestic companies once
we account for the democracy level of the host-country.
Table III.4: Democracy in origin country of operating company
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
df df df df df df df
post 4.192∗∗ 5.413∗∗ 5.454∗∗ 3.998 5.899∗∗∗ 6.111∗∗ 5.811∗
(0.012) (0.029) (0.035) (0.105) (0.010) (0.011) (0.068)
post x disc 0.167 0.0330 -0.170 0.535 0.570 0.0477 -0.662
(0.709) (0.953) (0.712) (0.267) (0.465) (0.914) (0.196)
post x inst 0.253 0.116 0.0782 0.165 0.794∗∗
(0.173) (0.416) (0.513) (0.282) (0.019)
post x disc x inst. -0.670∗∗ -0.692∗∗ -0.604∗∗ -0.684∗ -0.896∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.050) (0.034) (0.055) (0.005)
post x foreign inst 0.458∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗ 0.143 0.0642
(0.010) (0.038) (0.307) (0.671)
post x disc x foreign inst -0.723∗∗∗ -0.206 -0.511∗∗ -0.132
(0.000) (0.310) (0.017) (0.563)
N 37986 21424 21021 25792 12688 12285 12194
Wells 2922 1648 1617 1984 976 945 938
Well-FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time-FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Std. errors cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster
Sample full sample full sample full sample foreign op. foreign op. foreign op. home op.
Adj.R2 0.00755 0.00793 0.00866 0.00793 0.00917 0.00981 0.00809
Notes: p-values in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Standard errors clustered at the country
level.
inst is the demeaned democracy score in the country where drilling takes place, foreign inst is the
demeaned democracy score in the country of origin of the operating company of the well. Column 1-3
are based on all wells, column 4-6 on wells operated by foreign companies only, and column 7 on wells
operated by domestic companies only.
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Deforestation of different Company Types Companies may vary with respect to
how concerned they are with minimizing their local environmental footprint. E.g., only
a subset of the companies in our sample are members of a global oil and gas industry
association that claims a commitment to high environmental standard (IPIECA). We
do not observe companies’ efforts in protecting the environment directly. To investigate
whether the effect of oil discoveries varies across different company types, we consider
instead the following categories of companies: (i) national oil companies (NOC); (ii-iii)
the seven supermajors with and without their subsidiaries and acquisitions (IOC+ and
IOC); (iv) operators that drill in their country of origin (home); (v) operators that have
drilled in one country only in our entire data set on drilling (local); (vi) members of the
global oil and gas industry association claiming to be committed to high environmental
standards (IPIECA); (vii) companies listed on a stock exchange (listed); and (viii) large
operators as measured by the total number of exploration wells drilled by the company
in the entire data set on drilling (large–continuous measure of the number of wells).18
In Table III.5, a discovery by home operators, members of IPIECA and large compa-
nies appear to result in lower forest loss than a discovery by other companies, whereas
it is the opposite for the IOCs. However, these differences are no longer statistically
significant when we control for host-country democracy in table III.6. In contrast, the
effect of a discovery on forest loss does in all the regressions in table III.6 vary with the
level of democracy in the host-country. This adds to our confidence in our baseline find-
ing, that the variation in the forest loss after a discovery is driven more by host-country
institutions and less which companies that operates the well.
18We define the company categories in the following way: For nationally-owned companies (NOCs)
we include companies with a state ownership stake exceeding fifty percent. For IOCs we include the
seven supermajor companies and their subsidiaries - BP, Shell, ExxonMobil, Chevron, ENI, Total and
ConocoPhillips. For our IOC+ category we also include companies acquired by the supermajors. Our
IPIECA category includes all companies currently members of IPIECA. When we define “local” and
“large”, we use the entire data set on exploration drilling, which covers 122375 oil and gas exploration
wells across 114 countries drilled in the period 1884-2010. Table III.8 presents correlations across the
different company characteristics.
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Table III.5: Deforestation of different company types
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
baseline NOC IOC IOC+ home local IPIECA listed lnWellCount
post 4.254∗∗ 4.045∗∗∗ 4.408∗∗ 4.182∗∗ 4.312∗∗∗ 4.301∗∗ 3.735∗∗ 5.638∗∗ 2.596
(0.012) (0.006) (0.015) (0.016) (0.005) (0.016) (0.014) (0.029) (0.104)
post x disc 0.323 0.221 0.192 0.303 0.667 0.666 0.710 -0.469 1.097
(0.672) (0.738) (0.786) (0.647) (0.375) (0.490) (0.340) (0.728) (0.231)
post x group 0.722 -0.815 2.255 -0.272 -0.100 1.970∗∗∗ 0.606 0.342∗∗∗
(0.396) (0.584) (0.424) (0.758) (0.871) (0.006) (0.807) (0.001)
post x disc x group 0.988 6.370∗ -0.926 -1.167∗∗ -0.722 -1.406∗ 0.263 -0.164∗∗
(0.230) (0.091) (0.787) (0.028) (0.463) (0.056) (0.834) (0.018)
N 40079 40079 39611 40079 40079 40079 40079 15912 39611
Wells 3083 3083 3047 3083 3083 3083 3083 1224 3047
Well-FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time-FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Std. errors cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster
Adj.R2 0.00659 0.00678 0.00672 0.00664 0.00677 0.00662 0.00669 0.00827 0.00664
Notes: p-values in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Standard errors clustered at the country
level.
All groups are defined as stated in the text, columns (2) through (8) are dummies for the respective
groups, WellCount is taken in its logarithmic form.
Table III.6: Democracy in host country vs company types
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
baseline NOC IOC IOC+ home local IPIECA listed lnWellCount
post 4.192∗∗ 3.936∗∗∗ 4.359∗∗ 4.134∗∗ 4.346∗∗∗ 4.299∗∗ 3.707∗∗ 5.388∗∗ 3.028∗
(0.012) (0.008) (0.015) (0.016) (0.004) (0.016) (0.013) (0.045) (0.073)
post x disc 0.167 0.239 0.0340 0.103 0.440 0.285 0.548 0.566 0.559
(0.709) (0.622) (0.936) (0.798) (0.359) (0.658) (0.193) (0.639) (0.302)
post x inst 0.253 0.276 0.260 0.260 0.259 0.258 0.224 0.623∗∗∗ 0.242
(0.173) (0.160) (0.161) (0.173) (0.165) (0.167) (0.200) (0.002) (0.173)
post x disc x inst -0.670∗∗ -0.662∗∗ -0.649∗∗ -0.692∗∗ -0.662∗∗ -0.662∗∗ -0.641∗∗ -1.416∗∗∗ -0.679∗∗
(0.026) (0.033) (0.016) (0.027) (0.030) (0.023) (0.027) (0.000) (0.024)
post x group 0.858 -0.891 2.147 -0.545 -0.260 1.714∗∗ 1.034 0.307∗∗∗
(0.197) (0.583) (0.499) (0.548) (0.694) (0.010) (0.691) (0.001)
post x disc x group 0.104 5.409 -0.486 -0.917 -0.224 -1.272 -0.497 -0.0808
(0.854) (0.101) (0.891) (0.117) (0.813) (0.110) (0.707) (0.351)
N 37986 37986 37518 37986 37986 37986 37986 15769 37518
Wells 2922 2922 2886 2922 2922 2922 2922 1213 2886
Well-FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time-FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Std. errors cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster
Adj.R2 0.00755 0.00759 0.00758 0.00764 0.00774 0.00753 0.00761 0.00982 0.00762
Notes: p-values in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Standard errors clustered at the country
level.
All groups are defined as stated in the text, columns (2) through (8) are dummies for the respective
groups, WellCount is taken in its logarithmic form.
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In table III.7, we take the next logical step and investigate if the variation across
company types mitigates the role of host-country institutions. For example, a company
with high environmental standards may be able and willing to overcome the challenges
related to weak host-country institutions. To do so, we include an interaction term be-
tween the host-country democracy-level and the company characteristic. First we notice
that the role of the host-country democracy-level is robust across all regressions, except
in the columns focusing on listed and large companies. For the listed companies, the
coefficient is the same as before, but is statistical significant only at the 16%-level. For
the large companies, the host-country democracy interacted with the size measure (ln
number of wells) is statistically significant, suggesting that the effect of host-country
institutions depend on the company size. Also for IOCs, the role of host-country in-
stitutions is stronger than for other companies. The result that larger companies and
IOCs amplify the role of institutions may indicate that such companies adapt to the
local institutional setting more than others.
Summing up the results for the company types, tables III.5-III.7, our main take-
away is that the lower the democracy score of the host-country, the higher is the forest
loss caused by an oil discovery. This finding is also robust to including company fixed
effects, i.e. when we estimate the effect only from companies that operate in several
countries and control for everything that is constant over time for a company. We omit
these checks to save space, but they are available on request from the authors.
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Table III.7: Democracy in host country vs company types
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
baseline NOC IOC IOC+ home local IPIECA listed lnWellCount
post 4.192∗∗ 3.923∗∗∗ 4.381∗∗ 4.110∗∗ 4.234∗∗∗ 4.212∗∗ 3.706∗∗ 5.462∗∗ 2.998∗
(0.012) (0.008) (0.014) (0.017) (0.006) (0.021) (0.013) (0.034) (0.077)
post x disc 0.167 0.255 0.0137 0.109 0.523 0.284 0.525 0.0809 0.523
(0.709) (0.603) (0.974) (0.789) (0.297) (0.665) (0.216) (0.951) (0.392)
post x inst 0.253 0.211 0.303 0.274 0.0775 0.161 0.264 0.328 0.334
(0.173) (0.271) (0.148) (0.212) (0.516) (0.380) (0.207) (0.628) (0.249)
post x disc x inst -0.670∗∗ -0.623∗ -0.635∗∗ -0.594∗∗ -0.604∗∗ -0.723∗ -0.613∗∗ -0.651 -0.176
(0.026) (0.061) (0.022) (0.034) (0.034) (0.096) (0.018) (0.164) (0.468)
post x group 1.053 -1.324 -1.979 -0.345 -0.177 1.707∗∗∗ 0.991 0.309∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.212) (0.569) (0.656) (0.780) (0.007) (0.688) (0.001)
post x disc x group 0.0515 1.836∗∗ 0.638 -1.162∗∗ -0.365 -1.281∗ 0.0373 -0.0494
(0.921) (0.016) (0.843) (0.041) (0.746) (0.075) (0.980) (0.607)
post x group x inst 0.231 -0.739 -0.167 0.714∗∗ 0.326∗ -0.379 0.365 -0.0241
(0.149) (0.173) (0.816) (0.022) (0.080) (0.389) (0.669) (0.576)
post x disc x group -0.0998 -0.807∗∗∗ -1.086∗ -0.281 0.131 -0.00463 -0.955 -0.125∗∗
x host inst (0.615) (0.003) (0.053) (0.101) (0.774) (0.990) (0.135) (0.022)
N 37986 37986 37518 37986 37986 37986 37986 15769 37518
Wells 2922 2922 2886 2922 2922 2922 2922 1213 2886
Well-FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time-FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Std. errors cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster
Adj.R2 0.00755 0.00756 0.00792 0.00812 0.00797 0.00770 0.00766 0.00983 0.00781
Notes: p-values in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Standard errors clustered at the country
level.
All groups are defined as stated in the text, columns (2) through (8) are dummies for the respective
groups, WellCount is taken in its logarithmic form.
Table III.8: Correlation of company characteristics
(1)
IOC IOC+ listed IPIECA WellCount home local NOC
IOC 1
IOC+ 0.546∗∗∗ 1
listed 0.120∗∗∗ -0.260∗∗∗ 1
IPIECA 0.307∗∗∗ 0.0736∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 1
WellCount 0.0657∗∗∗ -0.0411∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗ 1
home -0.0238∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗ -0.0834∗∗∗ 0.0456∗∗∗ -0.0405∗∗∗ 1
local -0.211∗∗∗ -0.0101∗ -0.452∗∗∗ -0.404∗∗∗ -0.499∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 1
NOC 0.0285∗∗∗ -0.0806∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗ 0.0543∗∗∗ -0.282∗∗∗ 1
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. All groups are defined as stated in the text: WellCount is
a continuous variable taking any discrete value between 1 and 5945, the other groups are defined by
dummies.
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2.6 Robustness checks
In this section we present a series of robustness checks of our baseline result, column 4
in table III.2.
Table III.9: Excluding time fixed effects and including country-trends
(1) (2)
democ democ
post 2.321∗∗∗ -1.786∗∗
(0.002) (0.028)
post x inst 0.237 0.189
(0.203) (0.290)
post x disc 0.304 0.523∗
(0.540) (0.068)
post x disc x inst -0.641∗∗ -0.708∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.008)
N 37986 37986
Wells 2922 2922
Wells-FE yes yes
Time-FE no yes
Country-trends no yes
Std. errors cluster cluster
Adj.R2 0.00493 0.00882
Notes: p-values in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Standard errors clustered at the country
level. Demeaned Polity IV variable: Impact compared to the mean democracy level. Regressions have
well fixed effects, time fixed effects and the country-year trend
Year fixed effects and country trends In table III.9 we first exclude year fixed
effects. We then include both year fixed effects and country-specific time-trends. In both
regressions, the triple interaction-term post×disc×inst is negative and significant. Thus,
the result that an oil discovery has a greater impact on forest loss in countries with low
democracy scores is not driven by different underlying trends across countries.
Sample choices In table III.10 we present robustness checks with respect to our
sample choices. The first column simply repeats the baseline model for comparison,
which is based on all onshore wells with a positive tree cover (except tight holes, for
which the discovery information is secret). Column 2 is based on wells with at least
50% tree cover in their direct vicinity. Column 3 includes only wells located in biomes
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Table III.10: Different samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sample full 50% wild oil gas oil & gas full
sample treecover woods wells wells wells sample
post 4.192∗∗ 15.13∗∗∗ 5.384 6.492∗∗∗ 3.967∗∗ 5.361∗∗ 3.850∗∗
(0.012) (0.003) (0.259) (0.003) (0.042) (0.046) (0.029)
post x disc 0.167 1.910∗ -5.996 1.177∗∗∗ -0.862 2.153 0.468
(0.709) (0.099) (0.132) (0.007) (0.186) (0.257) (0.363)
post x inst 0.253 1.253∗∗ 0.656 0.255 0.251 0.260 0.255∗
(0.173) (0.033) (0.202) (0.171) (0.179) (0.178) (0.090)
post x disc x inst -0.670∗∗ -1.296∗ -1.139∗∗ -0.479 -0.358 -0.533 -0.670∗∗
(0.026) (0.055) (0.027) (0.106) (0.142) (0.243) (0.016)
post x wild woods 6.987∗∗
(0.049)
post x disc x wild woods -6.265∗
(0.077)
N 37986 7150 1118 19812 24388 10842 37986
Wells 2922 550 86 1524 1876 834 2922
Well-FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time-FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Std. errors cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster
Adj.R2 0.00755 0.0221 0.00421 0.00713 0.00662 0.00661 0.00753
Notes: p-values in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Standard errors clustered at the country
level. Demeaned Polity IV variable: Impact compared to the mean democracy level. regressions have
well fixed effects and time fixed effects; samples are (1) all onshore wells with positive tree cover and
either successful drilling or not (tight holes excluded) (2) only wells with at least 50% tree cover (3)
only wells in biomes classified as wildwoods according to SEDAC (4) only wells with finding oil or oil
shows and those not successful (5) only wells with finding gas or gas shows and those not successful (6)
only wells with finding oil &gas or oil & gas shows and those not successful (7) full sample as in (1)
including the interaction term of treatpost times the dummy if located in wildwoods
classified as wildwoods according to the Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center
(SEDAC). Column 4 includes only wells recorded with the finding oil or oil shows and
those not successful, column 5 includes only wells recorded with gas or gas shows and
those not successful, and column 6 includes only wells recorded with oil &gas or oil &
gas shows and those not successful. Our main result holds qualitatively across all these
samples. The triple interaction term is significant only at the 11%, 14% and 24%-level
respectively when we split the sample according to oil, gas and oil & gas finds in column
4-6, but we interpret this as an issue of low statistical power. Note also that the post-
dummy is positive and significant across all samples, except for wild woods, for which
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we only observe 86 wells.
Type of forest vs. democracy In the last column of table III.10, column 7, we
include interactions with a dummy for whether a well is located in “wild woodlands”
as defined by SEDAC Ellis et al. (2013) and our result holds. This deals with the
worry that many countries in the tropics may have both different types of forest and low
quality institutions. We might then conflate the two and wrongly assign differences due
to characteristics of tropical forest to the quality of institutions. However, it turns out
that the correlation between biomes and democracy scores is negligible and we observe
a large spread of democracy scores across all biomes (supporting graphs available at
request from the authors).
Table III.11: Autocracy and Polity
(1) (2) (3)
democ autoc polity
post 4.192∗∗ 4.128∗∗∗ 4.185∗∗
(0.012) (0.009) (0.010)
post x disc 0.167 0.264 0.187
(0.709) (0.498) (0.639)
post x inst. 0.253 -0.622∗∗∗ 0.198∗
(0.173) (0.003) (0.062)
post x disc x inst -0.670∗∗ 1.298∗∗∗ -0.468∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.000) (0.006)
N 37986 37986 37986
Wells 2922 2922 2922
Well-FE yes yes yes
Time-FE yes yes yes
Std. errors cluster cluster cluster
Adj.R2 0.00755 0.00761 0.00761
Notes: p-values in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Standard errors clustered at the country
level. Demeaned Polity IV variables: Impact compared to the sample mean.
Autocracy and Polity In table III.11 we investigate the role of autocracy and
“polity”. Column 1 repeats our standard estimate. Column 2 is based on autocracy,
where 10 means most autocratic (“low quality”) and 1 means non-autocratic (“high
quality”). Column 3 is based on “polity”, which is defined as the sum of democracy
and autocracy and ranges from -10 to 10. According to the polity IV project, a perfect
democracy is characterized by: unrestricted, open, and fully competitive political par-
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ticipation; freely elected executive power; and substantial constraints on the executive.
Autocracies, on the contrary, are characterized by: restricted competitive political par-
ticipation; executives who are chosen within the political elite; and executives who can
exercise power with few institutional constraints. For all three measures we find that
higher quality political institutions are associated with lower forest loss in the wake of
a discovery.
Additional Measures of the Quality of Political Institutions We now present
further evidence on the protective role of good governance. Table III.12 uses the The
World Governance Indicators, which provide measures on six different dimensions of
governance: Voice and Accountability (VA), Political Stability and Absence of Violence
(PV), Government Effectiveness (GE), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Rule of Law (RL) and
Control of Corruption (CC). All six measures run from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values
indicating a better quality of governance. For all indicators, we find the same as when
we use democracy in our baseline model. An oil discovery leads to higher forest loss in
countries with lower quality governance.
Table III.12: World Governance Indicators
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VA PV GE RQ RL CC
post 2.778∗∗ 2.737∗∗ 2.784∗∗ 2.723∗∗ 2.749∗∗ 2.799∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010)
post x disc 0.476 0.526 0.454 0.537 0.503 0.445
(0.443) (0.415) (0.476) (0.409) (0.449) (0.473)
post x inst 0.968∗∗ 0.803∗ 0.926∗ 1.059∗ 0.760∗ 0.765∗
(0.048) (0.052) (0.067) (0.096) (0.094) (0.069)
post x disc x inst -1.916∗∗ -1.510∗ -1.796∗∗ -2.230∗ -1.535∗ -1.467∗
(0.048) (0.076) (0.047) (0.056) (0.067) (0.050)
N 29874 29874 29874 29874 29874 29874
Wells 2298 2298 2298 2298 2298 2298
Well-FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time-FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Std. errors cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster
Adj.R2 0.00750 0.00744 0.00740 0.00736 0.00738 0.00741
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: p-values in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Standard errors clustered at the country
level. Demeaned WGI variables: Impact compared to the sample mean.
Table III.13 presents results for measures of Environmental Stringency. Environ-
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mental stringency is measured on a scale from 1 (very lax) to 7 (very stringent) by the
World Economic Forum. The stringency value is taken as an average of the available
data sets from the World Economic Forum: the years 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2013. The
rank of each country is taken from the 139 countries comprised in the data set in as-
cending order. While columns (2) and (3) support the general result of the importance
of political institutions for the preservation of forest in the vicinity of oil wells, columns
(4) and (5) show that environmental stringency does not contribute in addition to the
level of democracy. This reflects the high degree of correlation between measures of
institutional quality. I.e., once we account for one of them, there is little additional
variation coming from the second.
Table III.13: Environmental Stringency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
baseline Rank Value Rank Value
post 4.192∗∗ 6.105∗∗∗ -1.029 5.500∗ 1.765
(0.012) (0.002) (0.707) (0.052) (0.638)
post x disc 0.167 -2.465∗∗ 8.300∗ -0.778 1.759
(0.709) (0.028) (0.081) (0.563) (0.592)
post x inst 0.253 0.149 0.261
(0.173) (0.600) (0.271)
post x disc x inst -0.670∗∗ -0.606 -0.728∗
(0.026) (0.135) (0.069)
post x E.stringency -0.0369∗∗ 1.141∗ -0.0275 0.537
(0.023) (0.065) (0.348) (0.522)
post x disc x E.stringency 0.0556∗∗ -1.779∗ 0.0227 -0.325
(0.046) (0.070) (0.326) (0.673)
N 37986 38636 38636 36777 36777
Wells 2922 2972 2972 2829 2829
Well-FE yes yes yes yes yes
Time-FE yes yes yes yes yes
Std. errors cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster
Adj.R2 0.00755 0.00635 0.00629 0.00691 0.00689
Notes: p-values in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Standard errors clustered at the country
level. E(nvironmental) stringency is measured by the Rank of the country or a Value between 1 (very
lax) and 7 (very stringent).
Table III.14 shows that the correlation between our different measures of institutional
quality is high. This is also confirmed by our results above. This implies that it is
challenging to identify exactly which aspects of countries’ institutions matter most for
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limiting the forest loss due to oil discoveries. We have focused on democracy, because
this is arguably a fundamental aspect of institutions, whereas aspects such as Control of
Corruption may rather be seen as more narrow aspects or results of a well-functioning
democracy. Our thinking here follows North (1990) and Acemoglu et al. (2005).
Table III.14: Correlations across different indicators of institutional quality
democ autoc polity VA PV GE
democ 1
autoc -0.903∗∗∗ 1
polity 0.986∗∗∗ -0.961∗∗∗ 1
VA 0.762∗∗∗ -0.562∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗∗ 1
PV 0.667∗∗∗ -0.495∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ 0.955∗∗∗ 1
GE 0.717∗∗∗ -0.463∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗ 0.883∗∗∗ 1
RQ 0.735∗∗∗ -0.495∗∗∗ 0.660∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗ 0.874∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗
RL 0.679∗∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 0.925∗∗∗ 0.975∗∗∗
CC 0.731∗∗∗ -0.492∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗ 0.896∗∗∗ 0.990∗∗∗
Value 0.780∗∗∗ -0.589∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗ 0.888∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗
Rank -0.821∗∗∗ 0.660∗∗∗ -0.775∗∗∗ -0.864∗∗∗ -0.853∗∗∗ -0.827∗∗∗
gdppc 0.663∗∗∗ -0.420∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.916∗∗∗ 0.873∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗
RQ RL CC Value Rank GDPpc
RQ 1
RL 0.941∗∗∗ 1
CC 0.966∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 1
Value 0.897∗∗∗ 0.862∗∗∗ 0.901∗∗∗ 1
Rank -0.863∗∗∗ -0.819∗∗∗ -0.865∗∗∗ -0.986∗∗∗ 1
GDPpc 0.939∗∗∗ 0.936∗∗∗ 0.947∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ -0.813∗∗∗ 1
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. All measures of political institutions are defined as stated in the
SM-text. Value and Rank are indicators of environmental stringency.
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In our last robustness check, presented in table III.15, we deal with the critique
that the variation in the impact of an oil discovery is not due to the quality of political
institutions, but rather due the level of development which is in turn correlated with
the quality of political institutions. Column 3 shows that the interaction term with
democracy takes essentially the same coefficient as in the baseline model, whereas the
interaction with GDP per capita is insignificant.
Table III.15: GDP vs democracy
(1) (2) (3)
df df df
post 4.192∗∗ 3.821∗∗ 3.584∗∗
(0.012) (0.014) (0.019)
post x disc 0.167 0.140 0.133
(0.709) (0.823) (0.773)
post x inst 0.253 0.180
(0.173) (0.417)
post x disc x inst -0.670∗∗ -0.784∗∗
(0.026) (0.020)
post x lnGDPpc 1.036∗∗ 0.530
(0.033) (0.354)
post x disc x lnGDPpc -1.591∗ 0.340
(0.071) (0.634)
N 37986 39624 37583
Wells 2922 3048 2891
Well-FE yes yes yes
Time-FE yes yes yes
Std. errors cluster cluster cluster
Adj.R2 0.00755 0.00672 0.00765
Notes: p-values in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Standard errors clustered at the country
level. Variables of democracy and the logarithm of per capita GDP are demeaned. Analogues to the
measure of democracy, we use GDP per capita in constant PPP US$, measured as an average across the
1990s. We include it in the log form, as is normal in the economics literature.
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IV Part IV
International Trade in Second-hand Electronic Goods
and the Resulting Global Rebound Effect
Hanna Krings
Abstract
This paper analyzes the consequences of innovations in the electronic goods sector
for global energy consumption and identifies a global rebound effect with respect
to trade in second-hand electronic consumption goods. With the help of 2SLS-
regressions, the positive influence of trade in second-hand electronics on the respec-
tive penetration rates in developing countries and the consequences for worldwide
energy consumption are estimated.
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1 Introduction
In a world of ever faster innovations in the electronic consumption goods sector, a TV,
bought a few years ago, is already outdated. The quest for a new mobile phone is a
persistent companion and the energy efficiency rate of a new refrigerator beats energy
consumption of the one in place by far. Innovations in electronic goods motivate peo-
ple to substitute their possessions despite the remaining full functional capability. The
acquisition of a new electronic device is usually accompanied with lower energy con-
sumption. Simultaneously, consumers adapt their consumption behavior to lower costs
resulting from more energy efficient devices by increasing their consumption pattern.
For example, a new refrigerator or TV might be larger than the one that is being re-
placed. This change in consumer behavior offsets part of the potential energy savings
from improved energy efficiency. This shortcoming to the potential energy savings has
been first detected by William Stanley Jevons in 1865 and is widely known as rebound
effect (Sorrell, 2009; Alcott, 2005). In a vast literature, the direct as well as indirect
rebound effect have been analyzed and quantified showing that the adoption of more
energy-efficient technologies does not decrease total energy consumption by the expected
amount.19 This rebound effect is even more pronounced in developing countries due to
a larger distance to the saturation point in the consumption of electronic goods.20 Only
recently, Wei (2010) recognized that a national view on energy consumption is too
short-sighted and developed a general equilibrium model to analyze the global rebound
effect. Adding to this consideration, I take a closer look at the consequences of substi-
tuting used electronic goods for new, more efficient ones in industrialized countries for
worldwide energy consumption. This paper suggests that following the substitution of
used electronic goods for new devices in industrialized countries, the old goods are not
necessarily scrapped. Instead, second-hand electronics can be exported to developing
countries where the demand for used electronic goods at a cheaper price is comparably
high. I hypothesize that, on a global scale, the export of second-hand goods therewith
causes an expansion of the consumer group of electronic goods. That is, in developing
countries, imported electronics serve as primary purchases for the population. Hence,
I find that next to enabling an access to technologies from industrialized countries in
the developing world, energy consumption worldwide increases. On a global level, this
19See Sorrell et al. (2009) for a thorough review.
20Sorrell (2007); Roy (2000); Ouyang et al. (2010); Li and Yonglei (2012)
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export reduces energy savings gained by installing more energy efficient devices in the
industrialized countries. Consequently, a global rebound effect occurs.
Given its relative importance, energy consumption of private households in devel-
oping countries appears to be worth further investigation. In Germany, for example,
private households account for around 27% of national energy consumption (Umwelt-
bundesamt, 2010); this figure accumulates to even higher 39% for residential buildings in
the US (Kavousian et al., 2013). Consumer electronics make up for 22% of this residen-
tial electricity consumption, refrigeration causes an additional 28% (De Almeida et al.,
2011). Wolfram et al. (2012) demonstrate that the expected increase in world energy
demand in the period of 2007 - 2035 will be mainly driven by developing countries. The
primary purchases of domestically used electronic goods resulting from the increasing
income will play a major role. The authors refer to Dubin and McFadden (1984), who
identified energy intensive consumption goods, such as refrigerators and vehicles, as the
main drivers of domestic energy demand. Chugh et al. (2011) point out that vehicle
sales in India have increased by the threefold between 2002 and 2008. According to
Auffhammer (2014), the consumption of air-conditioning has also experienced an explo-
sive growth. Wolfram et al. (2012) view this as general evidence for an overall trend in
augmented primary purchases of energy intensive goods in developing countries.
This rise in primary purchases of energy intensive goods causes an increase in the
respective penetration rates in these countries. In order to analyze the international dif-
fusion of electronic goods and consequently a possible global rebound effect, the theories
on global technology diffusion serve as a stepping stone. Barro and Sala-i Martin (1997)
have introduced the innovator-imitator model as explanation for the diffusion of new
technologies. Data provided by the industrial commodity production statistics database
of the United Nations Statistic Division show that production of electronic consumption
goods in developing countries, mainly in Africa, is limited at best. Considering the often
lacking producers of electronic devices, the imitation process does not seem to work in
all developing countries. Instead of focusing on the imitation of electronic devices by
producers in developing countries, this paper takes a closer look at the access to these
devices for consumers through international trade. Grossman and Helpman (1995), as
well as Holmes and Schmitz (2001) and, in an empirical study, Comin and Hobijn (2004),
analyze the effect of international trade and “trade openness” on the diffusion of tech-
nologies and find a positive impact. Furthermore, Helpman and Trajtenberg (1996) look
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into the diffusion of general purpose technologies, while Acemoglu et al. (2007) investi-
gate upon the impact of different factor endowments on technology diffusion. In analogy
to the results of Caselli and Coleman (2001), Comin and Hobijn (2004) find that next to
GDP per capita, trade openness as well as human capital, political institutions, the level
of accumulated technologies, infrastructure of a country and the effectiveness of legis-
lature have a positive influence on the technological development of a country. Despite
identifying economic prosperity (GDP p.c.) with 23% as main explanatory factor for the
differences in technological diffusion between countries, Comin and Hobijn (2004) agree
with Basu and Weil (1998), Acemoglu et al. (2007) and Caselli and Coleman (2001) that
economic prosperity is not the unique explanatory factor for these differences.
Building upon these findings, I seek to explain the differences in penetration rates
of electronic devices between countries based on the trade effect identified by Grossman
and Helpman (1995) and Holmes and Schmitz (2001). Thereby, I focus on the impact of
trade in second-hand goods on the respective penetration rates. Due to data limitations,
this paper analyzes the diffusion of computers, televisions, refrigerators and radios as
representative examples for electronic goods in general. Finally, estimating the resulting
increase in energy consumption allows to quantify the global rebound effect. The next
section introduces the dataset on which the analysis is based. Next, trade with second-
hand electronic goods is identified. Afterwards, I apply a cross-sectional regression
analysis to provide support for the hypothesis of an increasing consumer group caused by
trade in second-hand goods. Here, the impact of trade on penetration rates is estimated.
Finally, the consequences for energy consumption are quantified. Before summing up
the results and giving an overall interpretation of the significance for the global rebound
effect in the conclusion, possible shortcomings of this analysis are exposed and justified
to the best of my knowledge.
2 Data
I construct two complementing datasets based on the availability of penetration rates
of electronic devices in developing countries. The database “Cross-country Historical
Adoption of Technology (CHAT)” by Comin and Hobijn (2009) provides information on
the number of electronic devices used in a country, such as computers, televisions and
telephones. The widest, and most recent coverage of data is available for the year 2002,
with records for the number of computers in 129 countries worldwide. Due to the low
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coverage with respect to televisions and the rather modest energy consumption of tele-
phones, the subsequent regression analysis only considers computers from this database.
Dividing the number of electronic devices in a country by its population size yields the
number of computers per inhabitant - the penetration rate.21 The Demographic and
Health Surveys (DHS) conducted by USAID (2012) additionally provide data on pene-
tration rates per household for radios, televisions, and refrigerators, i.e. the percentage
of households owning the respective electronic device, over different survey years. The
database comprises 71 developing or emerging countries with an average GDP per capita
of 2,730 USD. More than half of the sample consists of African countries. The surveys
were conducted between 1990 and 2012 in these countries. In most countries, however,
the surveys were carried out only once during this time period. Even though some coun-
tries were covered multiple times, the sample of these countries is too small to analyze a
change in penetration rates. In the case of multiple surveys, I always refer to the most
recent survey data for the respective country. On average, the surveys were conducted
in year 2005.
Representing the electronic goods sector, this study analyzes the international diffu-
sion of computers, televisions, radios and refrigerators. Data on the imported quantity
of these electronics goods by the countries covered in both data sets is taken from the
UN Comtrade Database (2014). The traded goods are defined according to SITC Rev.2
classifications given in table IV.A2 in the appendix. However, a distinction between new
and used goods is lacking from trade registers. A possible approach for the identification
of trade in second-hand goods is explained in the next section. The values of total im-
ports are recorded in million USD. Additionally, the aggregated weight and the number
of imported units is added to the data set, if available. Trade data is collected for the
corresponding survey year of the dependent variable, the penetration rates. In case of
lacking data in the specific year, the trading volume of the previous available year up
to three years prior to the survey year is included instead. Due to a high volatility in
trading volumes between years, robustness checks are undertaken with five-year averages
of trading volumes.
Additional controls are chosen in correspondence to Comin and Hobijn (2004) and
Grossman and Helpman (1995): economic prosperity with GDP per capita, trade open-
21In their dataset, Comin and Hobijn (2009) define the relevant variable as the“number of self-
contained computers designed for use by one person”.
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ness as the share of the sum of imports and exports to GDP, the population size of
a country and education according to secondary schooling. Data on these controls is
retrieved from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. A country’s house-
hold number is documented in the DHS surveys. Geographical indicators applied in
the construction of an instrumental variable are retrieved from the Centre d’Etudes
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) (Mayer and Zignago, 2011). All
explanatory variables are included in the database in correspondence to the survey year
of the dependent variable. Hence, I obtain one cross-sectional dataset for the year of
2002 with respect to computers for 129 countries, and one with varying years between
1990 and 2012 for televisions, refrigerators, and radios in 71 countries. The countries
included as well as the income classifications applied in the analysis are listed in table
IV.A3 in the appendix.
Data on average yearly energy consumption of electronic devices used in house-
holds is available from different European and US American studies. A survey called
REMODECE conducted by De Almeida et al. (2011) reports the average energy con-
sumption of eight classes of electronic goods in kWh per year for households of twelve
European countries. The study was conducted during the years 2006 to 2008 for 100
households in each country. Another European project (eepotential) involving 27 EU
countries reports yearly energy consumption for three electronic device categories per
household in selected years between 2004 and 2012 (Energy Economics Group, 2009).
The Fraunhofer USA Center for Sustainable Energy Systems (FhCSE) conducted sur-
veys on the energy consumption of consumer electronics used in US households in 2007,
2010 and 2013 (Urban et al., 2014). Furthermore, the authors present an overview of
previous studies on energy consumption of information and communication technology
(ICT) devices. A report commissioned by the German Umweltbundesamt (Environ-
mental Performance Agency, EPA) presents energy consumption rates for refrigerators,
freezers and televisions in the years 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2008 (Umweltbundesamt,
2010). All studies portray the actual energy consumption of the electronic devices in
place in the respective country of the survey. In addition to the state of the technology,
the consumption behavior of European and American consumers is therefore mirrored in
these energy consumption rates. However, to my knowledge, consumption behavior and
corresponding energy consumption rates per electronic device are not available for devel-
oping countries. Hence, I base the analysis on energy consumption data retrieved from
80
industrialized countries assuming that consumption patterns do not differ substantially
between countries. When comparing the energy consumption rates across European
countries no systematic differences with respect to climate areas or different income
classes can be identified. Due to the repeated performance of the surveys conducted by
the German EPA and the FhCSE, I apply the energy consumption rates reported in
their studies. Also, these energy consumption rates reflect the lower boundary of the
estimates presented in the various studies. Therewith, the energy impact quantified in
this study is estimated with the needed caution. An overview of the energy consumption
rates of the three electronic devices presented by the German EPA and the FhCSE is
illustrated in figure IV.1 and clearly shows a decrease in the energy consumption rates
per electronic device over the last two decades. The values generated by linear inter-
polation (dashed line segments) are in line with the data reported by the eepotential
project (Energy Economics Group, 2009), as well as the general finding of over time
decreasing consumption rates documented in the energy consumption literature.22 Only
for televisions the energy consumption rate has stayed rather constant over time. Here,
the increase in screen sizes as well as the development from tube monitors to flat screens
may have offset the improvements in energy efficiency. Data on yearly energy consump-
tion of radios is only available from the REMODECE project with 46 kWh per year in
2006/2008.
Based on these energy consumption rates, for the calculation of the global rebound
effect, I will distinguish between three kinds of electronic goods: new goods currently
used in the industrialized world, second-hand goods which are being sorted out in in-
dustrialized countries and old goods which are in place in the developing world. New
goods are defined as the ones in place in industrialized countries and are assumed to
perform according to the current energy consumption rates depicted in figure IV.1 for
2013. Second-hand goods are assumed to have been in place around 2006 in the indus-
trialized world and are replaced now and consequently exported to developing countries.
Old goods have even lower standards in terms of energy efficiency, approximately equal
to the energy consumption rates of products applied in 1995 in industrialized countries.
These assumptions are in line with a German and a British study, published by the
German Statistisches Bundesamt (2013) (federal Statistical Office) and Cooper (1994),
which classify refrigerators, telephones, computers and televisions as durable goods with
22See for example: IIIEE (nd), Ahmed (2012) and ZVEI (2012)
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Data on computers are retrieved from the FhCSE, values for 1995 and 2000 are linearly interpolated; Data
on refrigerators are taken from the German EPA, values for 2010 and 2013 are linearly interpolated; Data for
televisions are taken from the German EPA for the years 1995 through 2008, Data on 2010 and 2013 are taken
from the FhCSE
Figure IV.1: Energy Consumption per Electronic Device
a minimum usage time of five years but also often up to ten or twelve years. The lifespan
of reused electronic items, i.e. second-hand goods, has been estimated to accumulate to
an additional 3 years (Peralta and Fontanos, 2006). Accounting for the enormous repair
activities in developing countries, the lifespan can however be extended considerably
(Osibanjo and Nnorom, 2007).
3 Identification of Trade with Second-Hand Goods
Trade in second-hand electronics is not documented in international trade statistics.
The identical commodity codes for new and second-hand electronics makes tracking of
trade in used goods challenging. While academic research on trade with second-hand
electronics is scarce, field studies, e.g. conducted by the Swiss e-Waste Programme, pro-
vide evidence for trade flows in used commodities between industrialized and developing
countries. The share of second-hand goods in imported electronics lies around 70% in
Ghana and Nigeria (Amoyaw-Osei et al., 2011; Ogungbuyi et al., 2012). The share of
second-hand electronics in the imports of other African countries is estimated to be
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lower, but still amounts to between 15 and 50% (EMPA, 2009) of total trade volume.
The focus in investigative journalism often lies on illegal trade with electronic waste and
the detrimental environmental consequences. In contrast, to assess a global rebound
effect, this study focuses on imports of functioning second-hand electronic goods. Due
to practical reasons, this analysis is limited to the documented legal trade in electronics.
Trade in electronic scrap is restricted by the Basel Convention and, moreover, prohibited
for member countries of the European Union ruled by the EU-Guideline 2002/96/EG
on Waste of Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE). Hence, illegal and there-
fore non-documented waste exports, which are, however, partly repaired in developing
countries and often continued to be used, are neglected from the analysis.
In order to identify trade with second-hand goods, I take a look at the two sides of
the argument explaining second-hand trade between two regions of the world: demand
and supply. On the one hand, there is demand for cheap electronic goods in develop-
ing countries. A possible saturation level for electronic devices seems far from being
met. As can be seen in figure IV.2, penetration levels are gradually increasing with the
income level of countries. Except for radios, the penetration rates of electronic goods
in developing countries have large potential to rise. Panel (a) of figure IV.2 reflects
the penetration rates in households of 71 developing and emerging countries classified
in three income groups. Industrialized countries belonging to income class 4 are not
covered in the DHS data set depicted in panel (a). With increasing income, penetration
rates with respect to all products increase. The penetration rates per head, generated
from the CHAT Dataset and portrayed in panel (b), also illustrate the dependence of
penetration rates on income levels for computers. These illustrations are in line with
the findings of Wolfram et al. (2012) who analyze the development of energy demand
in developing countries and show that families emerging from poverty first acquire elec-
tronic household appliances such as televisions and refrigerators. Davis et al. (2014)
also expect households from emerging countries to purchase electric appliances as in-
come rises. The relatively lower penetration rates and the low income levels underline
the hypothesis that there is demand for cheap electronic devices in developing countries.
As data retrieved from the industrial commodity production statistics database from the
UN Statistics Division23 show, this demand can, however, not be met by domestic pro-
duction. Hence, international products have to satisfy the demand for cheap electronics
23available under http://unstats.un.org/unsd/industry/commoditylist2.asp
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Figure IV.2: Penetration Rates according to Income Classes
in developing countries.
However, on the other hand, data on the international supply of second-hand elec-
tronics to developing countries is missing. While trade in electronic appliances in general
is documented in international trade statistics, the lacking distinction between new and
used electronics asks for reasoning and anecdotal evidence to underline the assumption
of exports of second-hand electronics to developing countries. The challenge of lacking
data on international trade with second-hand goods has been addressed in several stud-
ies. In these studies, second-hand goods have been identified by their comparably low
value per kilogram exported of each product (Duan et al., 2014; Sander and Schilling,
2010). Based on this method, Duan et al. (2014) estimate an export volume of 870,000
used laptops for the United States in 2010. In 2011, USD 1.5 billion worth of used elec-
tronic products have been exported by the US (U.S. International Trade Commssion,
2013). According to a field study, around 155,000 tonnes of used electronic goods have
been exported from Germany in 2008 (Sander and Schilling, 2010). The lower value per
kilogram of used goods in comparison to new goods from the same country of origin
can be observed when comparing different groups of destination countries. Figure IV.3
demonstrates how richer countries import higher valued electronic goods. In panel (a),
the value per imported weight unit of a computer in USD per kilogram increases with
the income level of the receiving country. A similar picture is painted in panel (b).
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Figure IV.3: Mean Value of Imported Electronic Goods
When distinguishing between destination countries in Africa (1) versus other emerging
countries (0), a lower value per kilogram for all four electronic devices can be observed
when exported to African countries.
Even though trade with second-hand electronics cannot be uniquely determined, I
present strong evidence confirming the assumption that the share of second-hand elec-
tronics imported by developing countries is relatively high compared to the used goods’
share in imports of industrialized nations.24 Moreover, African countries can especially
be identified as recipient countries of used goods. In fact, a number of African countries
belongs to the main importers of second-hand goods. Coming back to the argument of
the imported goods value per kilogram, panel (a) of figure IV.4 shows, exemplary for the
case of used computers, that almost half of those countries importing computers with a
value below 15 USD per kg are located on the African continent. In panel (b) of figure
IV.4, African countries as well as the average of all countries that import computers
valued less than 20 USD per kg are depicted. Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon, Tanzania and
Sudan can be identified as the main importing hubs of second-hand imports with low
levels of value per imported kilogram but comparatively large imported quantities. The
average second-hand importing country represents all countries importing computers
24I acknowledge however the fact that the difference in value per kilogram can also mirror a differ-
ent quality of the imported good. As argued, anecdotal evidence convinces me to continue with the
assumption that developing countries import a larger share of second-hand goods.
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with a value below 20 USD per kg.25 Confirming this finding, Ghana and Nigeria have
repeatedly been identified as main hubs of used electronic goods and electronic scrap in
other studies (Sander and Schilling, 2010).
(a)
(b)
Own illustration based on imported values and weights retrieved from the UN Comtrade database.
Panel (a) shows all importers of electronic goods below 15 USD/kg;
panel (b) presents all African importers of electronic goods below 20 USD/kg.
Figure IV.4: Import Values and Quantities of Computers
25The three largest importing countries of low-valued goods, namely Russia, Indonesia and Ukraine,
are the main drivers for the high average volume of imported computers.
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4 Results
Having argued that developing countries, and specifically, African countries import to
a large share second-hand electronic devices, the question remains on what the conse-
quences of trade in second-hand electronics for developing countries are: Does this kind
of trade enable more consumers to have access to technologies from industrialized na-
tions or are the imported goods only enabling consumers to exchange their products for
newer devices? And, in a second step, what are the consequences for energy consumption
in developing countries?
With the help of a cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS-) regression, the effect
of trade on the penetration rate ρ of good n in the importing country i is identified
and quantified. With a multivariate model this effect is separated from other factors
influencing the diffusion of technology. The parsimonious model per good n is defined
as:
ρi = β0 + β1IMi + β2GDPpci + β3opennessi + β4Africa+ , (21)
with IMi giving the imported value of country i of electronic device n in million USD. In
analogy to Comin and Hobijn (2004), GDP p.c. and trade openness in general prove to
be relevant factors positively affecting the level of technology adoption in a country. A
dummy for African countries is chosen as additional control accounting for the continent
specifics. Other continent dummies were found to be insignificant and irrelevant for the
results. An indicator for the democratic constitution of a country, the polity2 index,
was also insignificant and therefore dropped from the parsimonious model. Similarly,
including education drastically reduces the sample size without allowing further insights
and is therefore also omitted from the model presented here. Table IV.1 displays the
regression outcomes on the respective penetration rates of the four electronic devices.
The total volume imported of each electronic good, given in million USD, represents the
explanatory variables of main interest.26 The coefficients and corresponding p-values
depicted in the table show the relevance of trade in electronic goods for explaining
cross-country variation in the respective penetration rates. All else being equal, the
diffusion of refrigerators, radios and computers is positively and significantly correlated
26Data on the traded volume in monetary units covers the largest sample compared to imports docu-
mented in units or weights. Moreover, for existing data, correlation between imported units and values
is highly positive and significant with correlation coefficients ranging between 0.5 and 0.98 depending
on the electronic device. Therefore, the analysis is based on imports documented in million USD.
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with imports of these products. Importing televisions has no significant effect on the
respective penetration rate.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
television refrigerator radio computer
GDP pc 0.00617*** 0.00594*** 0.000204 0.00131***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.859) (0.000)
TradeOpenness 0.153** 0.180** 0.109 0.0377**
(0.016) (0.020) (0.108) (0.021)
Africa -39.51*** -27.93*** 11.04** -2.292
(0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.182)
tv imports 0.00851
(0.145)
fridge imports 0.184***
(0.006)
radio imports 0.305***
(0.001)
pc imports 0.00035**
(0.028)
Countries 59 59 59 118
Adj.R2 0.747 0.626 0.195 0.812
The dependent variables are the respective penetration rates; p-values are
depicted in parentheses. Significance levels are marked by: * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table IV.1: OLS - Regressions on Penetration Rates
In addition to the findings on the trade effect on penetration rates of electronic goods
and in analogy to the suggestion from the descriptive part in Section 3, it is shown that
higher penetration rates of electronic devices come along with higher per capita income
in a country. However, the coverage of radios in a country is independent of GDP per
capita. This finding originates in the fact that radios classify to a lesser degree as high-
technology goods.27 A high level of trade openness in a country, measured as the share
of overall exports and imports to GDP, facilitates the diffusion of technology in addition
to the imports in the specific product category. The positive effect of trade openness
indicates the importance of globalization and international connectedness of a country.
Last, the Africa-dummy controls for the continent specifics such as the generally lower
level of penetration with respect to all high-technology goods. Again, radios are the
exception. Interestingly, when controlling for other factors, such as per capita income,
27As a consequence, the adjusted R2 is substantially lower in comparison to the explanatory power of
the regressions of the other three electronic devices.
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more African households possess a radio whereas this good has, apparently, been sub-
stituted by modern media on other continents.
The simultaneous causality between supply and demand for technological goods
strongly suggests a problem of endogeneity. Hence, a possible bias and inconsistency in
the coefficients estimated with OLS is expected. To control for the possible endogeneity
and to obtain a consistent estimator, I design an instrumental variable (IV). I adopt the
approach from Romer and Frankel (1999), also employed in the context of trade with
second-hand clothing by Frazer (2008), applying a gravity approach in the first stage
of a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) regression, to instrument for the import values.
Specifically, the value of imported electronic goods of a country IMi is predicted to be
a function of geographic variables. The specification of the bilateral trade equation is
IMi = γ0 + γ1Dij + γ2Ai + γ3Aj + γ4Ni + γ5Nj + γ6Li + γ7Lj + γx + uij , (22)
where Dij is the distance between two trading partners. A, N , and L describe the
trading partners’ land area and population and whether the country is landlocked. The
vector x accounts for the exogenous controls included in the second stage. The index i
describes the importing country, while the country indexed by j is i’s most important
trading partner with respect to each commodity. On average the most important trad-
ing partner, for which the country characteristics are chosen in the gravity equation,
accounts for around 50% of all imports in the respective good of a country. Romer
and Frankel (1999) suggest that geographical factors serve well as instrument of trading
volumes due to their strong correlation. Moreover, the combination of geographic at-
tributes of the trading partners does not directly influence the dependent variable. To
be more concrete, it is reasonable to assume that the orthogonality condition holds, i.e.
that the error term  is not affected by any of the instruments chosen.
The second-stage results of the 2SLS regression are displayed in table IV.2. The out-
come supports the results found by applying OLS and emphasizes the previous findings.
The sign and significance level of the coefficients of all previously significant controls
can be confirmed. Regarding the instrumented variable, the impact of trade in refrig-
erators and radios remains positive and significant. The impact of imported computers
barely misses the margin of being significant at the 10% level. In terms of magnitude,
the size of the coefficients increases for three out of four product categories. In eco-
nomic terms, the results show that ceteris paribus, e.g., importing refrigerators worth
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
television refrigerator radio computer
GDP pc 0.00620*** 0.00566*** -0.000403 0.00122***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.753) (0.000)
TradeOpenness 0.150** 0.175** 0.138* 0.0451**
(0.025) (0.030) (0.095) (0.019)
Africa -39.94*** -24.22*** 13.67*** -2.174
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.237)
tv imports 0.00467
(0.792)
fridge imports 0.285*
(0.057)
radio imports 0.436***
(0.003)
pc imports 0.0007
(0.109)
Countries 57 56 57 111
Adj.R2 0.738 0.593 0.164 0.807
Durbin 0.8067 0.4582 0.2358 0.3761
The dependent variables are the respective penetration rates; p-values are
depicted in parentheses. Significance levels are marked by: * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The Durbin test presents the p-values against the null hypothesis of ex-
ogenous variables.
Table IV.2: 2SLS - Regressions on Penetration Rates
one million USD increases the penetration rate on average by almost 0.285 percent-
age points. An increase in the consumer group resulting from importing second-hand
electronics can be concluded. This effect is statistically significant for refrigerators and
radios. The coefficient on the trade impact of computers and televisions also shows the
expected positive sign, albeit being insignificantly different from zero. The insignificant
coefficients indicate that, e.g., imported televisions do not reach new consumers but
serve as substitutes for existing appliances. Statistically, the coefficients are equal to
the OLS-estimates reported before. With p-values above at least 0.37 for all devices,
the null hypothesis of equal coefficients cannot be rejected based on the Wald test. The
results are also robust to different specifications. The regressions have been tested with
5-year averages to smooth trade volumes over a longer time period with similar results
as presented here for OLS- and 2SLS-regressions. Similarly, conducting the OLS- as well
as the 2SLS-regressions in log-log form supports the prior results. The outcome of the
log-log 2SLS-regression is depicted in table IV.A4 in the appendix. Here the dependent
variable is the logarithm of the number of each electronic device applied in a country.
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For example, a 10% increase in imports of refrigerators, on average leads to additional
1.6% appliances of this electronic device in a country. Considering the 95%- confidence
intervals increases this range by 0.1 to 3%.28
Testing the robustness of the instrumental variable approach, the Null-Hypothesis
of weak instruments can be rejected for all four products. Nevertheless, the joint cor-
relation of the instruments with the endogenous variable is rather low, such that a
considerable efficiency loss has to be born in mind. While theory clearly marks a prob-
lem of endogeneity due to simultaneous causality between imported electronic goods
and the penetration rates in a country, i.e. supply and demand, the Durbin test on
exogenous explanatory variables conducted on the 2SLS-regressions, depicted in table
IV.2, does not confirm this theory. Additionally, the Wu-Hausman test was conducted.
The test statistics, while not being displayed in the tables, support the findings of the
Durbin test in all regressions tested. However, in the log-log regressions, displayed in
table IV.A4, the null hypothesis of exogenous variables must be rejected for the cases of
radios and computers providing some evidence for the theory of simultaneous causality.
Despite limited econometric support for the suspicion of endogeneity but due to the
strong theoretical suggestion and the similarity in the quality of the results of OLS and
2SLS, I will continue with findings from the 2SLS approach.
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Figure IV.5: Trade Effect on Penetration Rates
28Depicted in figure IV.A1 in the appendix.
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The upper blue bar visualizes the trade effect coefficient for African countries.
Figure IV.6: Trade Effect on Penetration Rates: African vs. Other Countries
Figure IV.5 visualizes the trade effect per electronic device on a country’s penetration
rate, i.e. β1n, as estimated by the 2SLS-regressions. Panel (a) presents the trade effect
coefficients including confidence intervals for televisions, refrigerators, and radios from
the DHS dataset. Equally, the trade effect of computers is portrayed in panel (b) based
on the CHAT dataset. It can be seen that the effect of trade is positive and significant
at the 10% level for trade with refrigerators, radios, and barely for computer. When
distinguishing for different sub-samples, the impression changes somewhat. Figure IV.6
illustrates the trade effect estimates for African versus other countries in the respective
datasets. With the exception of the less technological good radios, African countries
(depicted as the upper bar in blue) experience a greater increase in their penetration
rates when importing electronic devices compared to other countries (the lower bar in
green). While the impact of imported computers turns insignificant, the remaining im-
ported electronic devices certainly increase penetration rates in African countries. In
this sub-sample, importing television sets also has a significant positive impact on the
penetration rate. The insignificant effect of imported computers suggests that these
imported devices in Africa are rather used as substitutes for existing computers. The
robustness checks conducted with log-log 2SLS-regressions and depicted in figure IV.A1
confirm this result. The limited sample size, however, gives reason to question the con-
sistency of the estimators in the sub-samples. Hence, I perform robustness checks by
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constructing interaction terms between the imported volume of good n and the African
dummy and running 2SLS-regressions on the full sample with instruments applied to the
imported volume and the interaction term. The results, presented in table IV.A5 in the
appendix, confirm the message conveyed in the graphical illustration and give additional
insights. For non-African countries, the effect of trade on the respective penetration rate
is only significant for radios. Performing the Wald test shows that the estimated coef-
ficients of the imported volume and the interaction term are jointly significant for all
electronic devices but computers. Hence, for African countries a positive and significant
effect can be observed for trade with televisions, refrigerators and radios. The difference
between African and non-African countries is however only significant for trade with
televisions.
The rise in penetration rates implies that due to trade, the worldwide number of
consumers of electronic goods increases since more electronic devices are used in devel-
oping countries. As a consequence, household energy consumption rises when developing
countries gain access to consumer electronics. Based on the findings shown above, I con-
tinue by estimating the resulting increase in energy consumption. The absolute change
in energy consumption per electronic device n in country i (4ECin) is calculated by
4 ECin = βn
100
× IMin ×#ofHHi × ECn, (23)
where βn gives the consistent point estimates displayed in table IV.2 for the trade effect
of good n, i.e. the increase in the penetration rate in percentage points per imported
million USD of good n. IMin gives each countries value of imports of good n in million
USD. Dividing by a hundred and multiplying by the number of households transfers the
rise in percentage points in the penetration rate to the absolute number of additional
goods in a country.29 Table IV.A6 in the appendix displays the last two decades’ values
of average yearly energy consumption per electronic device ECn as depicted in figure
IV.1. For the application of second-hand goods the energy consumption rates from
2006/2008 are assumed.
In table IV.3, the estimated average increase in energy consumption per electronic
device and country resulting from international trade is depicted. A distinction is made
with respect to the country group as well as two thought scenarios referring to the
29The penetration rate of computers is given for the population instead of for households. Therefore
the multiplication is conducted with the number of inhabitants for this product category.
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composition of electronic goods. For one, accounting for the differences between the
country sub-samples, the distinct changes in energy consumption per electronic device
4ECn can be calculated based on the respective import coefficients. Moreover, the
differences in traded volumes across sub-samples contribute further to differences in the
energy consumption effect of trade. Putting the increase in energy consumption in the
right perspective, a percentage increase with respect to the prior energy consumption
of each good in a country is calculated. Hence, a closed economy without international
trade is considered as counterfactual. And secondly, two scenarios are presented in table
IV.3. In scenario I, all goods imported are considered to be second-hand. Furthermore,
the existing electronics in the importing country are assumed to have the same energy
efficiency as the imported goods. Scenario II relaxes both of these assumptions. For
one, relying on the findings of the case-studies conducted by EMPA (2009), the imported
goods are assumed to be composed of fifty percent second-hand and fifty percent new
electronic goods. And second, the existing goods are thought of as old goods with worse
energy efficiency rates compared to second-hand imports. By assuming a rather long
usage time of the durables in developing countries the second scenario can be considered
as cautious estimates showing a lower boundary with respect to this concern. Since
historical data on energy consumption for radios is lacking, only scenario I is displayed.
Scenario I II I II I I II
Refrigerator TV Radio PC
All countries 26.09% 18.57% 1.90% 1.74% 10.14% 6.75% 4.73%
Africa 33.23% 23.64% 27.57% 25.24% 3.15% 10.35% 7.26%
Other countries 9.12% 6.49% -0.81% -0.74% 21.78% 8.08% 5.67%
Bold digits present changes in energy consumption that are statistically significant, at least with 90%-confidence.
Table IV.3: Average Increase in Energy Consumption - per Electronic Device and Coun-
try Group
For the matter of completeness, the table presents the percentage changes for all
four electronic devices in the whole sample as well as in both sub-samples. Based on
the results from the 2SLS-regressions, significant changes are presented in bold digits.
In general, a substantial increase in energy consumption caused by trade can be
observed. Since Scenario II presents more cautious estimates, these estimates will be
discussed below. Across the full country sample, the average increase per country and
per electronic good mounts up to 18%. The impact is largest, and mostly significant,
in the sub-sample of African countries. Only for radios, as the exception from the ad-
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vanced technologies, the increase in energy consumption resulting from trade in African
countries is lower than in the rest of the world. In African countries, international trade
with second-hand electronics causes an increase in device specific energy consumption of
up to 25%. The driving force for the larger impact among African countries can be iden-
tified as the trade effect, displayed in figure IV.6. I.e, despite the lower volume of trade
directed to African countries, energy consumption increases most in this sub-sample.
Overall, trade with second-hand goods raises the penetration rates of poorer countries
and therewith enlarges the number of consumers worldwide. Imports in other parts of
the world seem to be used to a larger extent as substitutes for existing devices. The
rather large point estimates are however put into the right perspective when considering
the 95%- confidence-intervals of the increase in energy consumption for the full country
sample, as presented for Scenario I in figure IV.7 showing the large variety in the impact
on energy consumption estimated. Despite the already large confidence intervals, there
are some remarkable positive outliers for which the impact on energy consumption is
extraordinarily high. With respect to computers, these remarkable positive outliers are
namely China, and below 100% India and Mexico. With respect to refrigerators, the
outlier is Nigeria. Concerning radios, five countries in transition experience an increase
in energy consumption of above 50%: Indonesia, Columbia, Brazil, South Africa and
Turkey.
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Figure IV.7: Confidence Intervals of the Increase in Energy Consumption
In absolute numbers, and accounting for a mixture of second-hand and new imports
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with more efficient energy consumption rates in comparison to the old devices in place,
the documented international trade in refrigerators, televisions and radios causes, on
average, a significant increase of 178,469 kWh, 186,715 kWh and 18,831 kWh respec-
tively in African countries. Aggregated over the 34 African countries included in the
DHS dataset, trade with these three30 electronic goods leads to an increase in energy
consumption of 13.1 GWh. Taking the full sample results and aggregating over all coun-
tries covered in my datasets, the worldwide increase of energy consumption accumulates
to nearly 62 TWh.
5 Conclusion
Innovations which lead to the application of new, more energy efficient electronic devices
are supposed to decrease energy consumption. The adaption in consumption behavior
and the resulting rebound effect, however, diminish possible energy savings. On a global
level, energy savings suffer further losses since the old, substituted goods are often con-
tinued to be used in other parts of the world. By distinguishing second-hand imports
from new goods by their lower value per kilogram, I provide evidence for the hypothesis
that a large share of exported electronic devices, specifically televisions, radios, refrig-
erators, and computers consists of second-hand goods when the destination country lies
in the developing world. Especially, some African countries have been identified as im-
porting hubs of used goods. In a second step, I analyzed the impact of these imports
on the penetration rates of the respective goods in a country. A special focus was set
on developing countries in order to investigate upon the effect of second-hand imports.
Applying 2SLS regressions in order to correct for possible endogeneity in the explana-
tory variable, a positive impact of imports of electronic devices on the penetration rates
in developing countries is found, while the effect is largest in African countries. In fact,
this rise in penetration rates provides support for the hypothesis of an increase in the
consumer group for electronic goods resulting from trade with second-hand electronics.
That is, the paper shows that substituting used electronics for more energy efficient ones
and subsequently exporting these second-hand electronics to developing countries leads
to an increase in the number of electronic appliances in use worldwide. Consequently
and when taking a world without trade as counterfactual, the increase in the penetration
rates leads to a a rise in energy consumption for these countries. Quantifying this rise in
30Computers are excluded from the aggregation due to the insignificant results.
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energy consumption, in African countries an increase up to 25% in energy consumption
per electronic device is estimated. Trade with refrigerators and televisions causes the
largest relative increase. Summing up over all African countries, an estimated additional
13.1 GWh are consumed. Including trade with new goods and extending the view to
non-African countries leads to an estimated increase in energy consumption of 62 TWh.
The findings presented here are a first step towards the analysis of trade in second-
hand electronics in the context of rebound effects. This paper aims to provide support
for a global energy consumption effect resulting from innovations in energy consuming
goods. The limitations of available data require, however, a cautious interpretation
of the findings presented here. On the one hand, only four electronic goods have been
analyzed. Further electronic consumption goods such as washing machines, freezers, and
other ICT devices, to name but a few, are omitted from the analysis here due to lacking
data. Therewith, the total size of the global rebound effect concerning all electronic
devices is underestimated. On the other hand, identification of trade in second-hand
electronic consumption goods is complicated due to limited data. Additional research
in trade with second-hand goods is required for the future. Lacking data prevents a
clear distinction between imports of second-hand goods and new goods. Therefore, this
study places a major focus on African countries where the share of second-hand imports
is highest. The increase in energy consumption based on a mixture of second-hand and
new electronic imports compared to even less energy efficient old electronics in place in
African countries can only be considered as a rough first estimate of the here defined
global rebound effect. Moreover, the absolute number of second-hand goods shipped to
developing countries cannot be identified. Hence, a possible substitution of outdated
electronic goods in addition to the identified increase in the consumer group cannot be
quantified. If substitution is large, the estimated increase in energy consumption due
to trade should be scaled down. Furthermore, the energy needed in the production of
new, more energy efficient electronic goods is neglected. In fact, continuing the use of
electronic goods may be energy saving when accounting for the energy expenditure in
electronic goods production. Finally, the widely discussed negative impact of trade in
electronic second-hand goods and waste on the environment due to insufficient recycling
technologies is not part of this analysis.
Despite the obvious limitations of the analysis conducted here, it can doubtlessly be
concluded, that estimations concerning the rebound effect after the introduction of new
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energy efficient technologies should not be limited to a national view. When introducing
improved energy consuming goods the worldwide consequences on energy consumption
need to be recognized. Despite this conclusion, the potential increase in welfare and
enabling of further development through the distribution of advanced technologies due
to trade in second-hand goods should not be forgotten.
6 Appendix
Product Classifications SITC Rev. 2 Description
Computers 752 Automatic data processing machines and units
thereof; magnetic or optical readers, machines for
transcribing data onto data media in coded form
and machines for processing such data, n.e.s.
Televisions 761 Television receivers (including receivers incor-
porating radio-broadcast receivers or sound
recorders or reproducers)
Radios 762 Radio-broadcast receivers, (including receivers in-
corporating sound recorders or reproducers)
Refrigerators 7752 Refrigerators of household type (electrical and
other)
Table IV.A2: Product Classifications
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Continent DHS - dataset CHAT - dataset
Africa Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central
African Republic, Cameroon, Chad,
Comoros, Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast,
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco,
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria,
Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Sao
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swazi-
land, Togo, Uganda, United Republic
of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Central African Republic, Chad,
Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Egypt, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho,
Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco,
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria,
Republic of the Congo, Rwanda,
Sierra Leone, Senegal, Somalia, South
Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia,
Zimbabwe
Asia Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cambodia,
India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Nepal, Pak-
istan, Philippines, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen
Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan,
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyr-
gyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia,
Mongolia, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan,
Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sin-
gapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Syria,
Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan,
United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan,
Vietnam
Australia Australia, New Zealand, Papua New
Guinea
Europe Albania, Armenia, Turkey, Ukraine Albania, Armenia, Austria, Belarus,
Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bul-
garia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ire-
land, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Lux-
embourg, Macedonia, Moldova, Mon-
tenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United
Kingdom
North America Dominican Republic, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua
Belize, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Do-
minican Republic, El Salvador, Geor-
gia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, United
States
South America Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Guyana,
Peru
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana Paraguay,
Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela
For the analysis, the countries are grouped into four income classes which are defined according to the World
Bank classifications; for classification, GNI data from the respective year of the penetration rate data is taken,
borderlines of income classes are set according to the guidelines of 2012, given below.
Income Classes: GNI per capita
in current USD
1 < 1035
2 1036 - 4085
3 4086 - 12615
4 > 12616
Table IV.A3: Countries included in the analysis
99
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(television number) log(refrigerator number) log(radio number) log(computer number)
log(GDPpc) 0.381*** 0.642*** 0.066 1.251***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.355) (0.000)
log(trade openness) -0.0103 0.314** 0.001 0.559**
(0.029) (0.051) (0.937) (0.025)
Africa -0.923*** -0.862*** 0.278*** -0.291
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.119)
log(Household) 0.822*** 0.621*** 1.012*** 1.299***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log(tv imports) 0.126**
(0.013)
log(fridge imports) 0.162*
(0.099)
log(radio imports) 0.012
(0.824)
log(pc imports) -0.253
(0.292)
Countries 57 56 57 111
Adj.R2 0.853 0.808 0.761 0.901
Durbin 0.3087 0.3255 0.0052 0.0058
The dependent variables are the logs of the total number of electronic devices in a country; log(Households) controls for
the size of the country; p-values are depicted in parentheses. Significance levels are marked by: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
The Durbin test presents the p-values against the null hypothesis of exogenous variables.
Table IV.A4: 2SLS - log-log Regressions on the Number of Electronic Devices
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
television refrigerator radio computer
GDP pc 0.00683*** 0.00607*** -0.000303 0.00123***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.798) (0.000)
TradeOpenness 0.103 0.154** 0.135* 0.0440**
(0.117) (0.039) (0.074) (0.020)
Africa -50.53*** -30.33*** 14.94*** -2.507
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.245)
tv imports -0.0151
(0.327)
importtv x Africa 0.0689***
(0.007)
fridge imports 0.149
(0.251)
importfridge x Africa 0.186
(0.334)
radio imports 0.442***
(0.001)
importradio x Africa -0.115
(0.568)
pc imports 0.000651
(0.122)
importpc x Africa 0.00668
(0.781)
Countries 57 56 57 111
Adj.R2 0.746 0.630 0.172 0.8096
Wald 0.0164 0.0376 0.0017 0.2934
The dependent variables are the respective penetration rates; p-values are de-
picted in parentheses. Significance levels are marked by: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
Interaction terms are formed between the instrumented imports and the Africa-
dummy. The Wald test statistic gives the p-value for joint significance of the
import variable and the interaction term.
Table IV.A5: 2SLS - Regressions with Interaction Terms
[kWh/year] [kWh/year] [kWh/year] [kWh/year] [kWh/year] [kWh/year]
2013 2010 2008/2006 2005 2000 1995
Refrigerator 195.7 217.5 244 256 279 309
Desktop PC incl. Monitor 244 304 320 335 373 401.9
Television 166 183 171 162 170 184
Hi-Fi 46
Data on computers are retrieved from the FhCSE, values for 1995 and 2000 are linearly interpolated; Data
on refrigerators are taken from the German EPA, values for 2010 and 2013 are linearly interpolated; Data for
televisions are taken from the German EPA for the years 1995 through 2008, Data on 2010 and 2013 are taken
from the FhCSE; Data on Hi-Fi devices is retrieved from the REMODECE study.
Table IV.A6: Average Yearly Energy Consumption
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Panels (a) and (b): trade effect coefficients for the full sample;
panels (c) and (d): trade effect coefficients for African countries (upper blue bar) vs. rest of the sample (lower
green bar).
Figure IV.A1: Confidence intervals of the Trade-Effect Elasticities
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